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Abstract 
          Arrangement of the study. The dissertation is consolidated of main studies, the 
first one is associated on the baseline survey in year (2014), the second is delineated 
on Analytical Hierarchy process in year (2015) and the third is based on linear 
programming in year (2016) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan. 
          The distinctiveness of Study 1. This study examines the present land tenancy 
arrangements and their long-term duration, which were manage informally in the 
landlord, tenant relationship. Also examines the relationship between each landlord 
and tenant in these tenancy contracts with their contractual parameters, then discuss 
the sole differences of the sample respondents in each contract, in comparison with 
famous research works in the field of land tenancy. The information was collected 
through baseline survey in year 2014 from February 1st to March 16th. This 
information was based on three major growing crops Wheat, Sugarcane and Tobacco, 
which were grown in the cropping year 2013, from the selected three villages of 
district Swabi Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan. Mixed method was applied to explore 
the quantitative as well as qualitative significance of the selected 30 respondents in 
this research work, also discussed features, Age in (year), Education in (year), family 
labors (men) and cultivated land size in (acre), as well as decision making behavior of 
the sampled respondents in these informal tenancy contracts. The finding of our study 
are long-term duration in tenancy contracts, which were recorded as, twenty-one 
year’s maximum and minimum of four years and their four different contract types, 
which were Share, Fixed, Owner cultivation and Multiple contract. All these finding 
shows the differences of this research work from the others researches empirical 
works in shape of long-term duration and multiple contract between one tenant and 
different landlords. This study recommends that the government should take some 
initiative towards land reforms and make these land tenancy contracts in written form 
in the study area and in country as a whole, so that it would be better for both the 
landlords and tenants to know about their contract contractual formation clearly, 
especially for the landless laborers in the rural Pakistan, which will give secure tenure 
status and more decision power, then the tenants will work hard and invest more in 
the land, through which we will see improvement in agriculture production in the 
country as well as for the whole region, which will also play a key role in future food 
security. 
          The distinctiveness of Study 2. New approaches and tools are needed to enable 
land tenancy arrangements in the developing countries to specify the landlord-tenant 
relationship in general and particularly in the targeted study area Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan. So, this research work applying a multi-criteria decision-
making approach (MCDM) to investigate the important factors which greatly impact 
on initial signing process of land tenancy contracts between landlords and tenants by 
using Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) as a tool, this qualitative decision making 
technique has not been used extensively in the country especially in the landlord 
tenant relations. For the purpose, we conducted survey in August 2015 and 
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interviewed 10 respondents (6 landlords and 4 tenants) in a hypothetical situation 
from the baseline survey through a well-developed questionnaire by using excel based 
“Tones” method in AHP. However, AHP is a methodology that facilitate respondents 
to trade off nonmarket factors of land tenancy contracts. Thus, the information was 
collected for the important factors (criterion) which has great effect in the initial 
contract agreement in the landlord-tenant relationship in our research area within 
each tenancy contract (alternative) then the important factors were incorporated in the 
AHP framework and subjected to the landlord-tenant judgments for each tenancy 
contract. The finalized, factors were, character, financial position, men power, 
experience, reference, land condition and house availability. The results of the AHP 
application to data collected from six different villages found that landlords’ 
preferences are strongest for character, men power in share cropping, distance, 
financial position in fixed contract, experience and men power in owner cultivation 
and the tenant’s partialities are strongest for house availability, financial position in 
share contract, land condition, reference in lease contract and in owner cultivation 
nothing found important. In overall we found that the dominant choice in the tenancy 
contract for landlords are share contract 45.7%, followed by rent contract 30.9% and 
less important owner cultivation 22.3% and in case of tenants we found that the most 
preferable land tenancy contract is sharecropping 51.7% and fixed contract 41.7%, less 
effective 6.25% owner cultivation in the selected study villages. This study 
recommends that the agriculture and extension services departments of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province to apply AHP as tool in the wide range of multi sector in 
agriculture decisions, such as to determine best allocation for farm production, 
adaptation of latest technological tools and choices among different food and cash 
crop. 
          The distinctiveness of Study 3. Being a developing country, the role of its 
agriculture sector in the economic structure cannot be ignored. This study applied 
linear programming farm planning model simulation to examine the economic effect 
of four major crops grower. For the purpose, two models were developed base on their 
land tenancy types, which are share model, fixe-rent model. The farm household 
survey data (2014-2016) of 30 farmers was implied for the model coefficients. The labor 
operation hours and profit coefficients were totaled for fixed-rent and share contract 
farmers based on per acre area. Also for LP models’ computation and optimal 
solutions the “XLP" method was adopted. The outcome of estimated models was 
recoded as optimal profit, land acreages and shadow price. The optimal solution of 
share model estimates was 228,032.9, fixed-rent 202,795 respectively. Therefore, the 
land tenancy models estimate suggested for sustainable agriculture development in 
the region that does not yet exit. This study recommends that the agriculture and 
extension services departments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province to apply XLP as a 
tool in the wide range of farm planning decision. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 History of the study province 
 
          Khyber Pakhtunkhwa history is greatly influenced by its location. As the 
gateway to the subcontinent, it has a long turbulent history of invasions by those who 
sought the riches of India. In 1849, the province came under British rule. The British 
East India Company led many campaigns into areas controlled by the Pathan tribes 
and secured their confidence. Till the late 19th century there was no formal border 
between Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Lord Curzon, inaugurated the 
province at ShahiBagh in 1902, and in 1931 it was elevated to the status of governor-
ruled province. In 1936 there were spearheaded disobedience movements against 
British rule. Among them popular freedom movement was launched by Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib. The province was granted self-
government in 1937.  
 
Source: (http://Kp.gov.pk/page/history_march_of_time). 
          The source to the above paragraph was provide from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
provincial government website.   
 
1.2 History of Land reforms 
 
          After independence, the government of Pakistan introduced land reforms in 
1959, 1972, and 1977 to put an end to landlordism, to improve ownership patterns, to 
stabilize the smaller farms, and to prevent their further subdivision. But due to 
numerous exception clauses, all these land reforms were unsuccessful. In KP the 
provincial government in its individual capacity tried to abolish the Jagirdari system 
and the exploitation of tenants by Zamindars. Most important were the abolition of 
Inamdari and Jagirdari system in 1938 in the pre-partition era. The KP Tenancy Act 
1950 and KP Protection and Restoration Act 1951 were enacted in the post-partition 
period. Despite these and the central government reforms of 1959, 1972, and 1977, the 
results were far from satisfactory. In 1981, 30 percent of all agricultural land was held 
by 0.5 percent of landowners who owned more than 150 acres per head (Khan 2012). 
 
1.3 Features of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
 
          The climate of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa varies immensely for a region of its size, 
there are four seasons (spring, summer, autumn and winter). The province is spread 
over 12.77 percent of the total area of Pakistan with the cultivated area of 1.65 million 
hectares. Its plain areas are very fertile and some of the hilly areas also produce good 
crops. The major crops and fruits of the region are (Rice Wheat, Maize, Sugarcane, 
Cotton, Chilies, and Tobacco etc) and fruits crops are (Peach, Plum, Pear, Apricot etc). 
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also the province are rich of natural resources like gas, Oil fields, mines of marble, 
Gems Stone, etc., in Pakistan the largest producer in Sui Gas, Uranium, Electricity, Salt, 
lithium, Steel, Coila etc.  
 
Source: (http://Kp.gov.pk/page/quickviewofkhyberpakhtunkhwa).  
          The source to the above paragraph was provide from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
provincial government official website.   
 
          The total area of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is (100200 sq.km) 74521 km2 and 
comprises on three zones. 
          Northern Zone: A mountainous region full of natural attraction having 5 small 
and big rivers. The Northern part of the province is exceptionally rich in pleasing and 
interesting landscape, exotic valleys and dense pine forest. 
          Mid Part: It comprises of Peshawar Valley, a seat of different civilizations. 
Peshawar is the Capital of the Province. Charsada, Mardan, Swabi and Noshera are 
the surrounding area of Peshawar valley with rich and fertile soil and with spread 
irrigation Canals network system. 
          Southern Zone: Rugged dry hills and vast gravelly plains with patches of sandy       
agriculture fields. The natural lakes and thick forests of the province are safe haven 
for eco-tourism. Ghandhara remains testify the rich cultural heritage of the province. 
 
1.4 Over all objectives of the study 
 
          To investigate the actual situation about land tenancy contracts in the study area, 
also to discuss the contractual parameters and duration on the basis of each tenancy 
contract in the landlord, tenant relationship. 
          To find out the importance of each type of contract in the landlord-tenant 
relationship in the study area, also to check out the important factor, from landlord 
and tenant point of view in these land tenancy contracts by using AHP. 
          To present analysis technique by linear programming that can be combined into 
farm management linear programing model, to examine the economic effect of the 
four major crops grower as well as their production and income. Also, will be checked 
out the efficient decision making behavior of share and fixed rent contract tenants. 
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1.5 Research Summary Chart 
 
 
 
1.6 Research Relationship  
 
          The first two studies were discussed the features of the land tenancy contracts 
in the landlord, tenant relation and the third one was based on the consultancy farm 
planning models for the targeted respondents. The relationship among these works 
are as follows: 
1.  Chapter 2 in Ph.D dissertation was the starting point of the work, provides the 
information based on the existing land tenancy types, features and their 
contractual parameters. 
2. Chapter 3 of the dissertation was developed on the finding of first work. AHP 
approach was implied, to know what types of factors working behind the long-
term duration of contracts and at a same time to distinguish the importance of 
each contract type. 
3. After knowing the feature and contractual parameters of the land tenancy 
arrangements in the study area, we developed chapter 4 of the dissertation. For 
the purpose two farm planning models were developed based on their contract 
type. To facilitate the targeted farmers by giving benefit through proper 
knowledge about cropping combination. The two simplex tableau were 
developed base on their contractual parameters.     
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Map of the Study province 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Map and profile of Province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa  
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the North West side of Pakistan, the population of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa is 26.9 million, with the land area of 74,520 km². 
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1.7 Review of Literature 
 
Review of Literature plays an important role in finding the remedy and 
solution of a particular problem. It helps us in doing the research work to work on it 
again and again and find out further information of a particular problem, which are 
hidden and need to be disclosed. Literature review is also important to identify the 
relevant research methodology and to specify correct analytical framework for the 
study in hand. Therefore, a brief review of some relevant literature is given in the 
following section. 
          The interpretation given by Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) is that it is used to 
overcome market imperfections other than that of land. If, for instance, (1) both 
management and supervision are important in production, (2). The landlord is more 
efficient at management while the tenant is more efficient at supervision, (3). Neither 
supervision nor management can be bought on the market for a fee, and then 
sharecropping may be a mechanism to effectively gain access to these two factors.   
 
1.7.1 Fixed Wage Contract  
          Under this contract, the landlord makes all production decisions, performs all 
supervision and management, and is the residual claimant. 
 
1.7.2 Fixed-Rent Contract 
          The tenant takes all the production decisions, performs all supervision and 
management, and the residual claimant. 
 
1.7.3 Share Contract. 
          The two partners decide jointly on M and L, and each partner decides how much 
to contribute of the factor in which he is most efficient, that is, management “t1” by 
the landlord and “s2” supervision by tenant. 
          Finally, the landlord should compare the maximum levels of income achieved 
under the three alternative contracts, that is, 1 1,
w ry y and 1
scy  and choose the profitable 
contract. 
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1.8 Empirical studies based on Pakistan  
 
          Review 1. The first empirical study which presenting here is the “Impacts of 
tenancy arrangements on investment and efficiency” (Akhter Ali et al., 2012). In this 
study they used farm level data from the Punjab Province in Pakistan to analyze the 
impact of three tenancy contracts on investment in soil-improving and productivity-
enhancing measures and farm productivity. 
          The theoretical framework of their study led to two hypotheses about the 
relationship between contractual arrangements and investment, as well as land 
rights and agriculture productivity. They specify the agriculture production function 
for the farm as  
                                ( ), , ; ,Y f X T N Z=  
          The maximized profit of the farm are given by   
                                ( ) ( )
, ,
max , , ; , ,
X T N
PY X T N Z WX R CNπ θ δ= − − −    
          They computed the cost of land as  
                                       ( ) ( ), 1 ,R R PYθ δ θ θδ
−
= − +  
          The maximized profit as expressed as a function of the price, the household 
endowments and characteristics, and the tenancy arrangements captured by the 
parameters as follow 
 ( ), , , , , .P W C Zπ π θ δ=  
          The application of Hoteling’s lemma to any well-specified profit function, yield 
the reduced-form specification for both conventional (labor) and nonconventional 
(organic manure, green manure, and chemical fertilizer) input demand and output 
supply 
                                   
( )
( )
( )
( )
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , , .
X X P W C Z
T T P W C Z
N N P W C Z
Y Y P W C Z
θ δ
θ δ
θ δ
θ δ
=
=
=
=
  
          The equations indicate that profits, input demand, and output supply are 
influenced by the tenancy arrangement, farm and household characteristics, output 
price, and input prices. 
          The empirical strategy they employed for, an instrumental variable approach 
to examine the impacts of different tenure regimes on output per hectare, account for 
farm and household characteristics. Also for the censored nature of the investment 
decision variables, they employed the tobit specification to capture the extent of 
investment in soil-improving measures. Expressed as; 
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          They specify tenancy arrangements as function of its determinants in the 
following regression 
                                                 ,im im im im im imQ J Zψ γ ξ= + +  
          The test for endogeneity is developed by, 
                                                            ,im im im imµ ξ φ ν= +  
Then produces the conditional model 
                                                    .im im im im im imJ Q τ ξ φ ν
∗ = + +  
 
          Review 2. “Incomplete contracts and investment: a study of land tenancy in 
Pakistan” (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2002). They point out, land specific investment is 
lower on leased plots than on owned plots cultivated by the same household, even 
after correcting for the effects of adverse selection in the leasing market. Differences 
in tenure security appear to be largely driven by heterogeneity across landlords in 
their willingness to commit to long-term relationships, suggested that some landlords 
value reputation more than others. Their empirical analysis draws upon a new 
nationally representative rural household survey (PRHS), which was completed in 
late 2001. To derive the implications, they incorporated investment into a standard 
limited liability model of land tenancy. 
          The econometric framework of their study based on the regression model for 
FYM use,  
                                        ci ci ci c ciM L Xα β ν ε= + + +   
 
          Review 3. “Impact of non-farm work and land tenancy contracts on soil 
conservation measures” (Kousar and Abdulai 2014). They employed multivariate 
tobit model that accounts for potential endogeneity between the intensity of 
investment and the non-farm work and tenancy arrangement variables is estimated 
for 341 rural households in Punjab province of Pakistan. Also instrumental variable 
approach is used to analyze the impact of tenancy arrangements and non-farm work 
on farm productivity. 
 
          Review 4. “Land tenancy and non-contractible investment in rural Pakistan” 
(Jacoby and Mansuri 2008). They used plot-level data from rural Pakistan and find 
that non-contractible investment is underprovided on tenanted land, even after 
controlling for endogeneity of leasing decisions. Their evidence also indicates that 
moral hazard in investment effort alone cannot explain this inefficiency. They further 
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show that a considerable portion of the variation in tenancy duration, and hence the 
security of tenure is due to heterogeneity across landlords.  
 
1.9 General review about land tenancy  
 
         Abhijit V. Banerjee 2004 described indeed, there is considerable evidence 
showing that the landlord-tenant relationship is typically a complex long-term 
informal contract with eviction threats often explicitly used is an incentive device. 
          Barrett, 2005 explained that, Farmers care not only for material satisfaction, but 
also about the values of social interaction and they willingly pay dearly for these. 
          Sadoulet et al., 1997 described The existence of kinship relations between 
landlords and share tenants may contribute to higher trust and confidence in which 
cheating is less likely to occur, reduce the conflict of interest, offer longer contractual 
relationship, and lead to interlinked transactions particularly for assistance through 
stages of the life cycle and mutual insurance. 
          Rahmato, 1984, stated that, the threats of eviction were a potent weapon in the 
hand of landlord and the tent over whom the danger of unemployment and 
destitution hung like the sword of Damocles, had no alternative but to accommodate 
all the demands of his landlord. 
Newbery 1974 stated that the output share in a share contract is not a price-like 
variable, and should not therefore be treated as a given by individual who are 
otherwise price-takers in a competitive model has been made by him. He was 
commenting on Bardhan and Srinivasan’s (1971) general equilibrium formalization of 
the misallocation arising from sharecropping, argued by Marshall I his famous 
footnote. Since then, numerous authors have made similar observation. 
Jaynes (1982, 1984) stated that in any event, his construct is not meant to 
provide a realistic solution to modelling the determination of equilibrium shares. His 
own explanation relies on a farm of capital market imperfection and does not assume 
that all individuals take the output share in share contract. 
            Alston, Datta, and Nugent (1984) described that another way round non-
existence of equilibrium while maintaining the assumption of share-taking behavior 
is that but this has its own problems. A better alternative is to do away with 
assumption of share-taking behavior. This is normally done in models of 
sharecropping. 
          Shetty (1988) model explained that the optimal landlords-tenant’s ratio is 1. Each 
potential tenant has the same reservation expected utility, determined by some other 
opportunities. Tenants are divided into several classes, according to their wealth levels; 
otherwise they are identical. There are moral hazards, so landlord’s choice contract 
parameters anticipating the tenants ‘effort responses. Wealthier tenants are more 
desirable, because they are less likely to default on agreed payments, and because they 
work harder in equilibrium. Hence landlords compete for wealthier tenants. 
Eswaran-Kotwal permanent labor contract model, when work effort cannot be 
effectively monitored and enforced, the fixed-rent contract dominates the share and 
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fixed-wage contracts in the absence of risk aversion simply because an increase in α 
always improves the efficiency of the contract. In contrast, if the contracting parties 
are concerned with income risk and work effort is unenforceable, a tradeoff arises 
between providing incentives and sharing risk and these results in the choice of a 
share contract. This implies that, if some form of the tradeoff relation emerges with an 
increase in α, the share contract will be chosen in equilibrium. 
The principal chooses the contract to offer in full knowledge of the optimizing 
behavior of the agent, under the constraint that the contract be at least as attractive to 
the agent as the agent’s alternative opportunities for employing his resources (Bell, 
1989).From the Marshallian theory of sharecropping, it is well known that output 
sharing creates disincentives for the tenant to work (Otsuka and Hayami, 1988). 
Sharecropping has been explained as a mechanism for risk sharing and for screening 
of tenants (Cheung, 1969, Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979). (Bardhan, 1983, Basu, 1984). 
The decision-making unit its production and consumption in accordance with its 
specific effective prices, the transaction occurs within the decision-making unit itself. 
Contracting with an outside agent and completing the exchange through a face-to-
face transaction as opposed to an open-market transaction. (Land, labor, Credit, 
products, management, supervision), Analyzing this subject takes the vast and 
fascinating theory of agrarian institutions. 
          The most attractive view of tenancy is that it substitutes for the absence or 
imperfections of a market for some factor inputs besides land. The absence or 
incompleteness of markets can typically result from the high cost of quality 
enforcement. Recent literature has pointed out technical know-how (Joseph Reid, 
1977), managerial ability ( Bell-Pinhas Zusman, 1979), bullocks (Nicholas Stern, 1982), 
credit (Gerald Jaynes, 1982), and family labor (Pant, 1983) as examples of factors for 
which market are highly imperfect. 
          William Hallagan (1978) and David Newbery-Joseph Stiglitz was used screening 
model to explain the existence of different contracts. The main problem which is 
address by sharecropping is to be the imperfection of information about tenant’s 
abilities; different types contracts are needed to find out tenants abilities, and also 
assume that the ignorance on the part of landlords about tenants abilities unsuitable 
for most rural communities. 
            Following Reid (1977) we envisage the landlord and tenant as both contributing 
unmarked resources in a sharecropping arrangement. We view sharecropping as a 
partnership arrangement in which both agents have incentives to self-monitor. 
          Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami,(1992) described that the population of agrarian 
economies is stratified into a spectrum of peasant sub-classes ranging from landless 
laborers to non-cultivating landlords who are organized by various land tenancy and 
labor employments contracts. Even today this peasant production mode provides the 
livelihood for the majority of mankind. 
          Eswaran and Kotwal 1985b and Roumasset Uy 1987 suggested that separate 
analyses of land and labor contracts have resulted in theoretical confusion as well as 
questionable interpretation of empirical data, (those drawing inferences about the 
  21 
 
relative efficiency of alternative contracts).The existing model do not explicitly 
consider the facts that the majority of farming H.H, S are owner cultivators and that 
virtually all cultivating H.H,S, including tenant H.H,S, hire the casual laborers during 
the peak seasons. 
          The models of labor employment explain the two-tiered structure of agrarian 
labor markets in which permanent or attached laborers are employed for a crop season 
or longer receive higher remuneration than casual laborers employed on daily basis 
(P. Bardhan 1984, Chs. 4 and 5; Eswaran and Kotwal 1985a).This work base on the 
theory of the principle-agent relationship Or, briefly, agency theory. (Holmstrom 1987 
and Daniel Leviathan 1988).The concerned optimum contract principal between the 
owner and agent of the resource. 
              Adam Smith 1776 and John Stuart Mill (1848) analyzed the relative merits of 
fixed –rent leasehold tenancy pervasive in England and share tenancy pervasive in 
France. Emphasized the different investment and work incentives to tenants under 
alternative contracts. The Alfred Marshall (1890) formalized the efficiency 
implications of share vs. fixed-rent contracts.  
 Steven Cheung 1969; C. J. Bliss and N. H. Stern 1982; and Gerald Jaynes 1984 
described that for survey of classical thought on share tenancy; Marshall maintains 
that share tenancy results in inefficient resource allocation because the share tenant 
receives as his marginal revenue only a fraction of the marginal product of labor and 
this reduces his work incentives. 
          Marshall and later, D. Gale Johnson (1950), and Cheung (1969) argued that, if 
the tenant work effort can be costlessly observed and enforced by landlord , resource 
allocation under share tenancy can be as efficient as under owner cultivation and 
fixed-rent tenancy. The requirement of costless monitoring, however, has been 
criticized as unrealistic. (Bardhan and Srinivasan 1971; Bell and Zusman 1976; and Bell 
1977). If the tenant’s effort is costly to monitor, then the share contract may be 
rationalized as a risk sharing device (Stiglitz 1974). 
          Bell and Braverman (1980) stated that in theories of land and labor contracts, it 
is not surprising to assume that share tenancy contracts are difficult to enforce 
whereas wage labor contracts are costlessly enforced (Bardhan 1984, chs. 4 and 5, with 
share tenancy model of Bardhan and Srinivasan 1971 and Bardhan 1984, ch. 10 and 
11). Such inconsistent assumptions have led to the conclusion of “the supremacy of 
wage labor over land tenancy contract”. 
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Chapter 2 Baseline Study 
 
2.1 Background  
 
          Agriculture is the backbone of the economy of Pakistan. It accounts for 22% of 
the country’s GDP and provides employment to about 45% of the total employed labor 
in the country. Crop production is a major contributor to the value addition in the 
agricultural sector. Major and minor crops constitute 33% and 12%, respectively, of 
the overall value addition in agriculture (Government of Pakistan 2009). However, 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is 10.17 million hectares, which is 13% of Pakistan’s total area 
(Government of KP 2014). However, due to well irrigation system and fertile soil, 
agriculture activities, also land tenure arrangements are more general in the mid-part 
of the province like (Mardan, Nowshera, Swabi, Charsada and Peshawar). 
           Pakistan is situated in Southern Asia, bordering Afghanistan 2,430 km, China 
523 km, India 2,912 km, Iran 909 km. The Capital of the country 
is Islamabad, Population: 159,196,336 (July 2004). Ethnic of the country is based on 
Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun (Pathan), Baloch, Muhajir (immigrants from India at the time 
of partition and their descendants). The religion of the country is based on the ratio of 
Muslim 97%, Christian, Hindu, and Sikh 3%, the official language of Pakistan is Urdu. 
Islam is practiced by the majority of Pakistanis (Heer, 2010). 
          From the independence Pakistan has engaged in feudal land tenure system, the 
unfair distribution of natural resources which made highly conflict society and 
division of peoples in upper, middle and lower classes. According to the USAID (2010) 
land tenure and property rights are one aspect of chronic poverty, corruption, 
undermining economic growth and fueling conflict. Moreover, that a more equal 
distribution of land might result in significant gain in the economy (Debraj, Ray, 1998 
Ch. 12 P. 456). Also the government was taken many initiative towards land reform 
regulation over the past many years to improve the landlord tenant relationship in the 
country but these legislations were still not existing.  
          Early post-independence period, redistribution land reforms was popular in 
South and Southeast Asian countries, even though its implementation failed because 
of strong opposition of the landed class (Like, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal), 
(Herring 1983; Ladejinsky 1977). However most of the landlords and tenants in 
Pakistan and particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were involved in traditional land 
tenancy contracts, which were manage informally by these landlords; also they hire 
the landless laborers from a competitive labor market for different land tenancy 
contracts and make agriculture production for his own household consumption as 
well as for the region.  
According to the World Bank (2009), 2% of households control more than 45% 
of all land, which severely constraining agricultural production competitiveness and 
livelihood opportunities.  
  23 
 
In rural Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, land is still existing the major form of wealth 
and family class differences among the rural people. According to the G.M. Arif (2004), 
the land tenure defines the social and political structures of a society, and determines 
the course of economic development, distribution of income and wealth. 
 To clarify the system of land tenancy, we must explain that tenancy 
relationships are surrounding within the larger social structure of Pashtuns society, 
with their own traditional norms. At present, three variants of private or individual 
tenure exist in Pakistan (Naqvi et al; 1989). The first variant is owner-cultivation, 
second sharecropping contract and third fixed-rent tenancy (Kousar and Abdulai 2015, 
Ali et al 2012, Hussain 1988).  
          Table 2.1. Shows the present land tenancy types and their contractual parameters 
in the study area. Also explained the percent share of the land owner and tenant in 
each type of contract based on the contractual parameters in the target area. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Explanation of the Land Tenancy Contract Types in the Study Area 
 
2.2.1 Owner-cultivation 
          In the research area, those respondents which utilized their natural resources by 
himself and were making agriculture production for their household consumption. In 
this case, the land owner taken all the responsibilities of management and supervision 
related to farm production by using his own family labors or some time hiring causal 
labor, especially in the peak cropping season (growing or harvesting). The landlord 
could self-cultivate by hiring unskilled labor and providing both supervision and 
management himself (Eswaran and Kotwal 1985).  
          However, Bijit (2003) defined, the system under which landowner cultivates his 
land himself with the use of family labors only and minimal use of hired labor. On the 
other hand, due to the availability of time, very few owner-cultivators interviewed 
during the field survey in the selected villages. Generally, in the study district, the 
availability of farm cultivated area among the majority peoples were small (< 4 acre) 
and medium size and very small portion of peoples occupied large cultivated area. 
The distribution of land and family owned resources among farming households 
relatively homogenous, so efficient resource can be achieved without tenancy 
transaction (Otsuka et al. 1992). 
          The reasons due to which respondents were working as a self-cultivator are; like, 
the availability of own family labor, no governmental jobs or owned private business 
as well as education, all these constraints in the research area restrict the individual to 
work on his own piece of land. However, the statistical evidence, in case of owner-
cultivator from the selected study villages related to, Age (years), Education (years), 
Cultivated area (acre) and Number of family labor (male) are reported. 
 
2.2.2 Share contract: 
          In the landlord-tenant relationship sharecropping were the most dominant form 
of land tenancy arrangements in the study area, which were working in different 
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flavors, so the most general one is the 50:50 ratios, the 75:25 crop share is also existing. 
The task division between them are decided with mutual consultation related to 
which crop to grow and input cost sharing, fertilizer, pesticide, weedicide and so on, 
also the yield maybe divided on equal basis immediate after the harvest. However, 
sharecropping contract, an arrangement is made between the landlord and the 
operator, such that part of the output is given to the landlord as compensation for 
using the land (Abdulai et al. 2011). 
          Thus sharecropping emerges as a way to share, not just the output of the 
productive activity, but the risk that is associated with it as well (Debraj Ray, 1998 ch. 
12 P. 434). However, Reid (1977) predict, the landlord and tenant as both contributing 
un-marketed resources in a sharecropping arrangements. The landlord and tenant 
could make share contract in which the former provides management and the latter 
supervision, and output is shared (Eswaran and 1985). 
          On the other hand, the initial contract term and condition in the country as 
whole, specifically in research area were working with verbal commitment, traditional 
norms and the decision rule or unwritten commitments are very hard to violate during 
the contract period. In case, if a very severe conflict arises between them, either party 
must be informing before the end of the contract time. However, the initial contract 
duration is one cropping year (e.g., two crop season), also the final decision power in 
share tenancy exist in the landlord hand in the selected villages. Moreover, the tenant 
status and decision making power in the share contract compared to fixed-rent 
contract were low in the research area.  
          Moreover, Steven Cheung (1969) defined, that share cropping offers the 
advantage of risk sharing while the other two contracts characterized by lower 
transaction cost. 
 
2.2.3 Fixed-rent contract: 
          In the study villages the second dominant contract are fixed-rent tenancy, in 
which the tenant pays cash money to the land owner. So in this case the tenant taken 
all the responsibility related to management and supervision, decide about farm 
production which is more profitable for him. However, Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) 
defines, that landlord lease out the land to a tenant for fixed lump sum rental, the 
tenant hires unskilled labor and provide both management and supervisor. If the 
enforcement of tenant efforts is the defining problem of the contract, the fixed rent 
contract dominates any other contract (Cheung 1969). 
          On the other hand, the task division and decision making power of the tenant in 
fixed contract are similar like the landlord in owner cultivation, during the contract 
period. The initial contract duration for fixed-rent contract in the research area is one 
year with verbal norms and mostly the payment will pay after the harvest of cash crop, 
for example tobacco and sugarcane, also some time it exists in written form, when a 
landlord have need of money for family oriented issues, (like son or daughter 
marriages or serious hospital issue etc.), then the initial duration were ranging from 1 
to 5 years. In this case, the landlord received all money in advance. 
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          The present way of payment per acre, especially in the selected villages and the 
study province as whole were defending on the fertility of the soil and irrigation 
system like equipped with canal, tube-well or unirrigated. So in our case, all these 
three villages have canal irrigation system and fertile soil. However, the landlord 
charges per acre in village Kadame were ranging from Rs 30,000 to 35,000, in 
Fazleabad and Kaludher Rs 35,000 – 45,000. 
           However, the tenant has the incentive to maximize the surplus under a fixed 
rental contract where he keeps the entire output and pays only a fixed rent to the 
landlord, who has the bargaining power to extract the entire surplus by appropriately 
determining the rent (Sen 2011, Hritonenko et al 2014). 
 
2.2.4 Mixed contract: 
          In the landlord-tenant relationship, we found a contract in which one tenant was 
working with more than two different landlords, both in share and fixed-rent contract. 
Due to the long settled of the tenant families in these villages, they know the landlord 
families as well as their relatives. However, the occupied farm cultivated area in acre 
of the respondents which involved in multiple contracts, the area in acre under share 
contract was higher than those of fixed contract. We observed from these respondents, 
that they made the fixed contract with the relative of share landlord, also some land 
they occupied in fixed are women oriented. 
          The mixing of different contracts may be difficult to accomplish in practice, it all 
depends on the structure of the market (Debraj Ray, 1998 ch. 12 P. 436). However, 
Newbery (1977) described, even if mixing is possible to find a safe asset, such as a 
fixed-wage contract that is lacking in all uncertainty, in such circumstances 
sharecropping may well dominates whatever can be achieved by mixing fixed-rent 
tenancy with a risky wage contract. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Explanation of the Contract Duration in the Research Area 
 
          In the study area the land tenancy relationship in which both parties, landlords 
and tenants, were involve with annual years of tenancy contracts, which may be more 
than two crop seasons. Under these contracts, most tenants stayed with the same 
landlords for a number of years, also continuously involved in producing agricultural 
products for their own household consumption as well as for the country and region. 
          In the relationship of the sample respondent in contract duration, the options of 
increasing punishment and reward, through inter-linked contracts, provide extra 
work incentives to the tenant. Because the landlords support their tenant through 
advance credit, both in crops peak season and his family oriented issues, like marriage, 
death and political circumstances, especially in share tenancy. Sadoulet et al (1997) 
described the existence of kinship relations between landlords and tenants, and the 
characteristics of share tenants which may contribute to higher trust and confidence. 
For example, cheating is less likely to occur, reducing the conflict of interest, offering 
longer contractual relationship through stages of the life cycle and mutual insurance.  
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          Especially for long-term duration of the contract it is important to discuss about 
the following points which leads to best relationship between landlords and tenants 
for their future contracts with some famous literature.  
 
2.3.1 Reputation 
          In our study area the landless farm population were usually long settled in the 
same district or village’s community and people know each other quite well through 
an efficient mouth to mouth communication with some traditional norms, except 
those who were come seasonally to the area. So reputation is certainly playing one of 
the important roles in landlord-tenant relationships. For example, if anyone interrupt 
these contract norms this fact soon become known in the close village community, 
which will make troubles for both parties in future tenancy arrangements.  
          In these three selected villages therefore for the long-term contract duration the 
tenant should be concerned with his reputation. This means he is more likely to care 
for the land as well as for landlord family and developed good social relationship with 
them, also with neighbor tenants. However, we observed that tenants made 
investment more in the land during these long-term duration of tenancy contracts and 
were more efficient compared to those tenants which were involve in short-term 
contracts, at shortest one crop season, or working seasonally in our research area. Thus 
in the landlord-tenant relationship reputation will play key role for the continuation 
of these long-term duration in the selected villages. However, the loss of the 
reputation from both parties were decrease the expectance of these long-term 
contracts duration in the study area. So, if there is a failure to take the action prescribed 
by the contract that results in a loss of reputation that causes such a reduction in 
welfare, and at last the contract become effectively enforceable (Holmstrom 1983).  
          Also interlink contract (like borrowing credits or enjoying other kinds of 
supports from his landlord) with reputation were working and both parties did 
actions according to the situations and made co-operation with each other, rather than 
agriculture related issues. For instance, they helped out each other, especially in their 
traditionally ways of marriages, death circumstances and politically support as well.  
 Otsuka et al. (1992) in his agrarian studies pointed out, major puzzles, such as 
the prevalence of the 50:50 sharing ratio in tenancy, the absence of fixed payments in 
share tenancy, the equality of output and cost sharing rates, and the low interest rate 
charged on credit provided by the landlord to his tenanted laborer, cannot be 
understood without considering the inter-linking of contracts. 
 
2.3.2 Eviction threats  
          The eviction threats are also one of the main points in this research, which works 
like a weapon for the landlords and they use it according to the circumstances, related 
to crops and tenancy contracts in the study villages. However, Banerjee and Ghatak 
(2004) described indeed, there is considerable evidence showing that the landlord-
tenant relationship is typically a complex long-term informal contract with eviction 
threats often explicitly used as one of the incentive devices. In contrast, the degree to 
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which a tenant actually uses threats of eviction, however, may depend on the degree 
of social distance inherent in landlords-tenant relation (Kassie and Holden 2007). 
          Also they were control the unobservable level efforts of the tenant to make sure 
the first-best output in share contract and rent per year in fixed-rent contract in the 
selected three villages. James (1974) described that under certain conditions, however, 
it is possible for the principal to elicit approximately the first-best effort level from the 
agent by threatening him with an arbitrarily severe penalty whenever a very small 
output may be observed.  
          We heard from the sample respondents, that most landlords tend to make the 
final discussion with their all tenants at one time in a year, especially after the harvest 
of cash crops (tobacco and sugarcane) about the total cost on production, yield, and 
income, (which was grown in the cropping year) in (50:50) share tenancy or rent per 
year from fixed-rent, in his home. 
          After the final discussion the landlord pointed out the weak points of the tenant 
from the previous year contract like (low productivity or tenant engaged in other 
activity) in share contract and timely payment of rent in fixed contract and give some 
threats related to his future contract, so to achieve the first best efficiency from the 
future contract. Moreover, Debraj Ray, (1998 Ch. 12, P 463) described eviction as 
another instrument that the landlord might use to provide incentives and discussed 
situations in which eviction clauses may be implicit or explicit in tenancy 
arrangements. 
 
2.3.3 Efficiency and behavior 
          In the study area we pointed out that the first best efficiency of tenancy contracts 
in the landlord-tenant relationship are achieved, because of continuously working in 
the same farm from many years, due to which they invest more in the land, also 
tenants developed highly socialized and reliable environment in these long-term 
relationship with landlord family, as well as their efficient skills in agriculture 
production. This means these tenancy arrangements can be long-term contracts. 
Barrett (2005) explained that, farmers are taking care not only of material satisfaction, 
but also of the values of social interaction and they willingly pay dearly for these. 
          Also the availability of various choices of these land tenancy arrangement, 
which were working in different form of share and fixed-rent contract. On the other 
hand, the government institutional land reform laws still do not exist in the country 
as a whole and specifically in research area. We observed that those tenants who 
involved in short-term (one crop season) land tenancy contract or were working in 
labor contracts in the selected villages, their first-best efficiency is not reinstated, 
because of unenforceable work efforts of these landless laborer, with their behavioral 
aspect as well, comparatively those which were involve in long-term contract duration. 
          In agrarian literature Otsuka et al. (1992) explained that the significant 
inefficiency of share tenancy is not common in areas where both share and fixed-rent 
contracts are available options. Inefficiency tends to arise where contract choice is 
institutionally restricted. So it is clarified from the results that there is the availability 
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of wide range of choices in informal traditional land tenancy arrangements in the 
study area, that the good decision opportunity to the landless labors are provided and 
they are making competent decision among them. However, the enforcement 
mechanism will be stronger in more tightly structured communities in which the 
rights and obligations of each member are more clearly defined by tradition (Hayami 
and Kikuchi 1981). 
 
2.3.4 Wealthier and Skillful tenants 
          In our research area, we mainly focused on the tenants who were comparatively 
wealthier than other tenants, however in the study area, due to competitive labor 
market, when a landlord want to make contract with a tenant, at first landlords ask 
how many own family male members and which kinds of agriculture technology, like 
Bullocks, Tractor, other Equipment’s and so on, they have. Secondly, the landlords 
check his own experiences of each tenant, like how long the tenant had been working 
in agriculture sector.  
          Especially in case of 50:50 share contract, the landlords tend to want to share 
agriculture production risk with tenants, who make every effort to make the first best 
output from the contract. On the other hand, in case of fixed-rent tenancy, the landlord 
tends to check the financial position of the tenant because the land owner wants to 
make sure his per year rent, might be cash money in many cases, from the contract. 
However, majority of the selected respondents in research area involved in share and 
fixed-rent tenancy contracts and few of them were owner cultivator. So all these 
characteristics in the landlord-tenant relationship in the study area were playing 
important role for the long-term contract duration.  
          Bell and Zusman (1989), explained that empirical research, which attempts to 
identify the determinants of contract choice with due consideration of household 
characteristics, is still lacking. Also Shetty (1988) stated in his paper that differences in 
tenant’s wealth imply corresponding differences in liability when default is possible 
on fixed rental commitments. The selection of tenants and the contract terms they 
receive thus depend on wealth with wealthier tenants being preferred and receiving 
fixed rent contracts. His land endowment is largely hereditary, and is out of 
proportion to his farming experience and skill. 
 
2.4 The Objectives of the Study 
 
          The objective of this study is to investigate the actual situation about land 
tenancy contracts in the study area, also to discuss the contractual parameters and 
duration on the basis of each tenancy contract in the landlord, tenant relationship. 
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2.5 Combination of the Study: 
 
          Mixed methods will be applied to the assumptions in understating to the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data to find out about the socio-economic 
as well as the contribution impact of the tenant in the society in the region. 
          Through the combination of the qualitative and quantitative analysis we will 
justify about the three different villages and their contractual formation for the 
tenancy contract and their features. 
 
2.6 Dynamics of the Study: 
 
          There are four types of contracts in the selected villages which are Fixed Contract, 
Share Contract, Both Fixed and Share contract as well as Owner Cultivation. The 
research will be based on the literature and features of the area according to the 
theories and will be analyzed through the specific mentioned conditions in the study 
area. 
           Both the tenants and the landlords are involved in these traditional types of 
contracts. The main focus for the study is the behavior of the tenant and its effect on 
the production in the region. 
 
2.7 Structure of the Study 
 
          The thesis is made up of parts. Remaining Section following this introduction is 
organized as follows, 
          In part 1, general introduction related to study area and review of literature of 
previous studies on overview of the theories of tenancy contracts and the relationship 
between landlord and the tenants. In this section also explain the general model of 
three land tenancy contracts. 
          In Part 2, Introduces area of the study, this includes environmental and social 
economical characteristics of the area. It also introduces statistics used in the study 
and model for tenancy contracts is used for estimating the results of the study. 
          In Part 3, the Evaluation of Land Tenancy Contracts by using the Analytical 
Hierarchy Process.  
          In Part 4, the economic evaluation of contractual choices with farm planning. 
          In part 5, Observation and models results. 
          The last part is consisted on conclusion and recommendations for policy makers.  
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2.8 Methodological Structure of the study 
 
          This section of the chapter describes the research site sample design and research 
instrument used for the collection and analysis of the data. The main purpose of this 
research was to find out the features and relationship between landlords and tenants 
in the study area in district Swabi Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan. 
 
2.8.1 Study Area 
 The selected study area was District Swabi, which is situated in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan. The majority of living people in the study area are Pashtuns, 
their locally speaking language is Pashto, and their religion is Islam the majority of 
people were working in agriculture sector, which were play important role in the GDP 
of the KP province as well as for the whole country and region. The total square 
Kilometers area of District Swabi is 1543.  The total population census 1998 is 1026804 
persons, in which 50.31% are male and 49.69% are female in the study area. The Urban 
population is consisting of 17.45 % and rural population is consisting of 82.55%. The 
average household size is 7.7 while the literacy ratio is 36.0% in which male ratio is 
54.0% and female ratio is 18.3% in the district Swabi. (P.B.S 2012)  
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Figure 2.1 the Map of the Study Area 
It shows the administrative units and union councils of the districts. The 
red line shows the boundaries with the other District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
Pakistan. 
                  Source: Google Map 
  
  32 
 
2.8.2 Survey Design 
 
2.8.2.1 Sampling 
The Questionnaire was pre-tested in the research area. After this pre-test, 30 
respondents were selected in the three villages of District Swabi. The landlords who 
have reputation in these three villages helped us and made advices in order to select 
30 respondents. Each respondent has excellent skills of agricultural production, and 
producing all or some of three major crops (Tobacco, Sugarcane and Wheat). 
          As results, this sampling has the potential for bias, which these respondents are 
comparatively skillful in agricultural production and management. 
 The number of sampled farmers that were selected from each village of the study area 
is given:  
 
 2.8.2.2 Questionnaire 
A comprehensive interview schedule/questionnaire was prepared to collect the 
primary data from the respondents. The interview schedule was pre-tested in study 
area so as to improve it by further including all relevant questions. Each (respondent) 
was interviewed personally at his home/or/field. 
 
2.8.2.3 Implementation 
The interview schedule was pre-tested in the field accordingly on 1st Feb 2014 
which was finished in 15th of March 2014. From which we were collected information 
about different tenancy contracts, their duration and data related to three major crops 
(wheat, tobacco, sugarcane) which were grown in year 2013. During this one and half 
month, I made interviews for both the landlords and tenants in their houses.  
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Table 2.2 the Selection of Sampled Tenants in the Study Area 
Villages Sample Size 
Kadame  13 
Kludair 7 
Fazle-Abad 10 
Total 30 
          Source: Preliminary Survey 2014 Feb 1st. 
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2.9 Basic Statistics  
 
The collected data was tabulated and analyzed by using MS Excel and SPSS 
(statistical Package for Social Sciences) computer programs in order to achieve the 
specific objectives i.e. to analyze the mean and standard deviation of the Age, 
Education, Family size and Farm size group of each of the respondents from three 
selected villages and were also to calculate the maximum and minimum duration of 
different tenancy contracts. 
 
2.9.1 Current statistical situation of the contracts duration in the study area. 
This section is based on the duration of the contract which has explained with 
different features of the sample respondents. 
The tenancy contracts and its duration is a very important point in this research 
work, we made four different duration categories of the selected respondents with 
their villages and contracts duration.  
Table 2.3 shows the distribution and the statistical values of the sample 
respondents about contract duration in the three selected villages. 
So in village wise comparison, the maximum duration of village Kadame 21 
years, Fazleabad 20 and Kaludher 15, with reported mean values are 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0 
respectively. In the four contract duration categories, the respondents belong to 
“Duration 6-10”, their mean value was 8.5. The second highest category was 
“Duration 0-5”, with mean value 4.6, the other two duration categories “Duration 11-
15” and “Duration 16-“were the same number of respondents, with their mean values 
15.0 and 19.4 as reported. So in the village and contract duration wise mean value was 
10.2 in years and its standard deviation was 5.5 of the sample respondents. These long-
term durations of the respondent’s reveal that, they play the main role in producing 
agricultural products for their own family consumption as well as for landlord family 
and were making contribution in the socio-economics for the whole country and 
region.  
          From the results of long-term duration of the contracts the new idea can be 
raised, that the landlord-tenant relation was working in strong mood. We observed 
from the selected respondents, that both parties feel much secure in these long-term 
duration of the contracts, especially in side of the tenants. Banerjee and Ghatak 
(2004) explored that in the context of agricultural tenancy, it is widely believed that 
tenants who have secure tenure will tend to invest more in the land, which seems to 
be a straightforward corollary of this preposition. However, in the country a 
considerable portion of the variation in tenancy duration, and hence in the security 
of tenure, is due to heterogeneity across landlords (Jacoby and Mansuri 2008). 
Also in these relations, landlords who had enough decision making power, so 
they have easily monitor tenant behavior towards agricultural production because he 
had the enough power to implement his decision on his share tenant. On the other 
hand, in lease case, the landlord has restricted, like (about crop selection, input use 
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etc.) during the period of the contract, but still occupied some power, like caring of 
irrigation channels, field boundaries etc.  
Table 2.4 shows the age features of the sample respondent’s bases on their 
duration of the contracts in the study area. Due to the inefficient attention of the 
previous researches work towards these features in the land tenancy arrangements, 
we were exploring each characteristics of the sampled respondents in three different 
villages and pointed out that in village Kadame, the majority of tenants were younger 
with their mean value 43.7 as compared to other two villages, their mean values were 
52.6 and 55.3 respectively. On the other hand, in comparison with their contract 
duration, the respondents involved in duration category (6-10) their mean reported 
value 43.8 which were comparatively younger, with highest numbers than those 
which involved in other duration categories. So the age in years of the sample 
respondents in different villages and contract duration groups, the total mean years 
age was 49.4, variation 14.2, their maximum, minimum values were 70 and 24 as 
reported from the study area. Otsuka et al. (1992), pointed out that existing studies do 
not pay sufficient attention to the characteristics of households, market conditions, 
and the community structure that would determine relative contractual efficiency and 
contract choices. 
Table 2.5 shows the education in years of the sampled respondents with their 
duration. So in the village wise comparison the respondents in Kadame, their number 
of year of education were high with mean value 4.5, compared to other two selected 
villages, then we were made educational comparison of the sampled respondents with 
their land tenancy contract duration, from which the respondents belong to 6-10 years 
duration, their year of education and numbers were high with their average value 6.6, 
compared to those respondents which involved in other contract duration categories 
0-5, 11-15 and above 16 years respectively. We assumed in the study area that 
comparison of education status in the relationship between landlord and tenant, the 
education status of the landlord family was high because of highly available resources, 
and the tenant family education status were not high, depending on their low wealth 
and available resources. Rao (1971) described that landlord families, with their higher 
wealth and social standing, are likely to have required better education compared to 
tenant families. 
Table 2.6 shows the number of male family labors in the selected three villages, 
then we were spread out all the respondents in four different parts, the higher number 
of male labor were working in village Kludair, with their mean value 5.6, the 
maximum number of male family labors was 15 and minimum was 2 as depicted, 
comparatively higher than in other two selected villages. In comparison with duration 
of the contracts, the duration 6-10 with the mean value 3.3 was the highest number of 
respondents in the study area. The second highest respondents who involved in the 
study area with the duration of 0-5 and its mean value was 4.3, the lowest number of 
respondents was 5 for both the duration of 11-15 and above 16 their reported mean 
value was 6.0 and 3.4 respectively. In the research area it very hard for the landlord to 
cultivate his own land, because some of them were engaged in their own private 
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business and some were working in governmental sector, also due to the lack of latest 
agricultural technological equipment’s in the study area as well in the region, the 
agriculture production required high intensive labors, so they were hiring some 
landless labor to utilize their natural resources and grow agriculture crops, so the 
landlords were making different forms of land tenancy and labor contracts with these 
landless laborers. However we observed, in our research area, that to monitor the 
landless labor efforts in permanent labor contract, it’s very hard and costly for 
landlord. The institution of permanent labor creates a variety in agricultural labor 
contracts that is of intrinsic interest, it may be both better off and worse off than those 
in causal labor contracts (Debraj Ray, 1998 Ch. 13 P. 505). However in India, Pakistan, 
the permanent labor contract is closely associated with caste status: permanent 
laborers belongs to the lower castes and their employers to the higher caste (Thorner 
and Thorner 1962; Breman 1974; P. Bardhan 1984, Ch. 3 and George 1987). Also he was 
willing to give his land on share and fixed-rent contracts or he become an owner-
cultivator by hiring some causal labor. 
Table 2.7 shows the farm size cultivated area in acre of the sample respondents 
with their tenancy contract duration in the study area. The differences of the villages 
show that farm size in village Kludair were high with their reported mean value 9.3 
and their maximum cultivated area was 22 acres, as compared with other two selected 
villages, their means values were 6.3 and 7.7 acre respectively. In the comparison with 
duration years of the contract the average cultivated area in acre of the respondents in 
duration 11-15 was 11.4, higher than those respondents which belongs from other 
duration categories. In the study area majority of farm size were small and medium, 
also most of the landlords and tenants were in relations of share tenancy (50:50) ratio. 
Because the landlord was living together with his tenants in the same village or 
neighbor to the tenant village. So the landlord has advantage of monitoring his 
tenants' work effort, compared with absentee landlord, which were living outside 
from the research area or living outside of the country. We observed that, due to the 
insufficient attention of governmental sector towards land resources in the country as 
whole and especially in research province, highly fertile agriculture farm cultivated 
area were rapidly changes to the housing scheme as well as super markets. Also highly 
increased population over the past years, the most severe problem of the research 
villages, that the present growers highly restricted to grow different fruits crops like 
melon, orang, water melon etc., and sugarcane as well. Also we checked out such type 
of characteristics in the long-term duration contract relationship of the sample 
respondents in research area. 
 
2.9.2 The types of the tenancy contracts with empirical results in study area 
To explain the four types of contracts in study area we learned from the 
literature that among these contracts the share tenancy is more common in Asia. So 
the information which was collected from the selected respondents provides evidence 
that in Pakistan, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the share tenancy was dominant 
as compare to fixed-rent and fixe-wage contracts. On the other hand, a landlord 
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personal capacity to monitor farm work of his tenant on daily or weekly basis are 
limited in the study area, however large landowner tends to choose fixed-rent tenancy, 
also landlords, who have good experienced in the field of farming and have the ability 
to monitor their tenant’s efforts and behavior on daily or monthly basis or from the 
yield, also has a good management skills are involved in share contract. However, in 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) permanent labor contract model, when work effort cannot 
be effectively monitored and enforced, the fixed-rent contract dominates the share and 
fixed-wage contracts in the absence of risk aversion. In contrast, if the contracting 
parties are concerned with income risk and work effort is unenforceable, a trade-off 
arises between providing incentives and sharing risk and these results in the choice of 
a share contract (Otsuka et al. 1992). Thus, the statistical results of land tenancy 
contracts in study area and evidence from the literature shows that landless laborer in 
the rural Pakistan as well as in the region were make efficient choices from a wide 
land tenancy arrangement spectrum, which were ranging from casual and permanent 
labor employment to long-term tenancy as well as owner cultivation. We considered, 
that respondents in the selected three villages were make efficient choices among them, 
because all these contracts arrangements were working under no institutional 
constraints. On the other hand, the landlord in the study area, who were manage all 
these contracts arrangements informally, tend to choose those contract in which he 
has the ability to enforce contractual term and condition. Bell and Zusman (1989) 
explained, that the principal chooses the contract to offer in full knowledge of the 
optimizing behavior of the agent, under the constraint that the contract be at least as 
attractive to the agent as the agent’s alternative opportunities for employing his 
resources. Also in the wide range of agrarians literature sharecropping has been 
explained as a mechanism for risk sharing and for screening of tenants (Cheung, 1969, 
Newbery and stiglitz 1979). 
 Table 2.8 shows the age wise distribution of sample respondents with respect 
to type of land tenancy contracts in the study area. The table shows that majority of 
the respondents were in the age group of below 40 years, in both villages and contract 
wise, also the table shown village wise distribution of respondents from each selected 
village, which belonging from the same age group. The second dominant group of the 
respondent was of those which age group was of 60 years and above. The statistics of 
the study shows that in village Fazle Abad the average age was 52.6 years while 
maximum age observed was 70 years and minimum age observed was 32 years. In 
village Kadame the mean age was 43.7 with maximum age of 70 years and minimum 
age of 24 years. In Kaludher the mean age observed was 60 years while the maximum 
age was again 70 years with minimum age of 36 years was reported. The table also 
shows that the majority of respondents followed share contract as well as both share 
and fixed type of contracts. In the group of share contract, the number of respondents 
was 17 with different age group as the mean age was 52.2 years, maximum age was 
70 years and minimum age was 32 years for respondents with share contracts. On the 
other side in the group of both share and fixed contracts the total number of 
respondents were 10 with different age groups but mean age was 43.4, maximum age 
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was 70 years and minimum age observed was 24 years. A small proportion of the 
respondents also followed fixed contracts and a few were owner cultivator. The table 
reveals that in the landlord, tenant relationship in study area majority of the sample 
respondents were farmers with very few owner cultivator and were involve with 
many types of land tenancy contracts agreements. 
Table 2.9 shows the education status of the respondents with in each selected 
village and tenancy contracts, with their education year groups, which were ranging 
from 0 to 10. At the first step, in village wise comparison, the number of respondents 
in village Kadame, their mean year education was 4.5 and the other two villages with 
their educational year means was reported as 3.3 and 2.8 respectively, with their same 
maximum and minimum year of education. In the second step we made comparison 
on the basis of share and both share and fixed contracts, so the respondents which 
involved in share contract, their mean years of education was 2.2 and respondents 
which were involve in multiple contracts, their mean years of education was 5.6. On 
the other hand, the respondents belong in 0-year education group, they were high in 
numbers, compared with others education years groups. We observed that in landlord, 
tenant relationship in research area, the respondents which were involve in multiple 
type land tenancy contracts, they were more skillful because of his high years of 
schooling. We also assumed that recently changes in agricultural technologies in the 
country as well as in developing region, the educated tenants will play important role 
in the production of high quality agriculture products. 
Table 2.10 describes the number of male family labor involved in the four types 
of tenancy contracts in the selected study area, the first part of table shows the 
distribution of sample respondents in four different family labor size categories and 
in second part we made the comparison with types of tenancy contracts, so in the 
village wise comparison the mean value of Kaludher village was 5.6, and the other 
two villages was reported 3.9 and 3.2 respectively. On the other hand, male family 
labor in the multiple contract was high with reported mean value 5.2, which was 
higher than those of share contract. So in total the average male family labor was 4.1. 
However, Pant (1983) explained that in a tenancy contract family labor is regarded as 
a crucial resource, since it is easier to supervise one’s own family labor than to 
supervise hired workers, a tenant may be considered to have labor supervision 
abilities superior as compared to landlord. 
Table 2.11 describes the cross tabulation of current contracts duration on the 
basis of four different types of land tenancy contracts. In the first stage, we made 
village wise comparison of the sampled respondents, so in village Kadame, the 
maximum year 21 of duration of the sampled respondents were high compared to 
other two selected villages, but their minimum year 4 of duration were same in all 
selected three villages respectively. Also in the year duration category 6-10 their 
numbers were high compared with other duration years categories. In the second 
stage, we made contracts type wise comparison with their contract duration. So we 
were choose only share contract and both fixed and share tenancy contracts in the 
selected three villages. So in the comparison, the number of respondents which 
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involved in share contract, their mean and maximum values were 10.8 and 21, 
compared with both fixed and share.  
Table 2.12 describes the cultivated area in acres, which was used in year 2013 
for selected three major crops. First we made analysis of each selected village with 
their farm size cultivated area, the mean farm size in village Fazle Abad was 6.3 which 
is less than the mean value of the other two selected villages, their cultivated area in 
acre were 7.7 and 9.3 as reported from the research area, the variation of farm size in 
Village Fazle Abad was 2.6, which was less than as compare to other two study 
villages, there values was 3.9 and 6.6. The farm size minimum values of each selected 
village were not so high but the maximum farm size 22 in village Kālu Dher was high. 
In case of tenancy contracts the average farm size in share contract was 6.7, which was 
less as compare to both fixed and share contract, the average was 10. On the other side, 
sampled respondents which belongs from farm size category 4-8, they were in 
majority, compared with other farm size categories. The table also reveal that the 
cultivated area in the study district either small or medium size, so the majority of the 
sampled respondents were involve in share tenancy. Also the landlord who’s 
cultivated land area are small and familiar with agriculture technology, market as well, 
were prefer share contract. But those Landlord were far away from their field or 
government employee, they give their land on fixed contract in the research area. 
Table 2.13 represents the cultivated area in acre of the respondents which 
involved in both fixed and share contracts. Then we made four different categories of 
farm size on the basis of their sample differences. We were also make three different 
assumption of the mixed contract, first, two respondents have the same cultivated area, 
their mean value was 2.8, maximum and minimum values were 3 and 2.5 acre 
respectively. In the second assumption there were no such respondents which have 
greater cultivated area than share contract. Third, the maximum number of 
respondents has less than cultivated area in acre from share contracts, their mean 
value was 2.6, Max and Mini values 4 and 1 as reported. In general cultivated area in 
the study villages were small. However the income status of both landlords and 
tenants were not so high, also the opportunities to earn income from others sources 
were very low, specifically in case of tenants. We also heard from the respondents 
during the field visits that in the mixed contract the land area of the landlords were 
very small or he involved other activities like governmental job, private business etc. 
or women oriented land. 
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Table 2.1 the feature of the present tenancy types and their contractual parameters 
in the study area 
 
Tenancy type 
Land Owner Tenant 
Cost Labor Yield Cost Labor Yield 
Owner cultivator 100 % 100 % 100 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
Fixed-rent contract 0 % 0 % 0 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Share contract 50 % 0 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 50 % 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.3 the feature of the contract duration in the three selected villages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification 
Villages Statistics 
FAZLEABAD KADAME KALUDHER Total mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N 
of 
HH) 
(years) (years) (years) (years) 
FAZLE ABAD     10.0 3.0 20 4 
KADAME     11.0 5.5 21 4 
KALU DHER     9.0 4.5 15 4 
Duration 0-5 4 2 3 9 4.6 0.5 5 4 
Duration 6-10 3 6 2 11 8.5 1.8 10 6 
Duration 11-15 0 3 2 5 15.0 0.0 15 15 
Duration 16- 3 2 0 5 19.4 1.7 21 16 
Total 10 13 7 30 10.2 5.5 21 4 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.4 the feature of the age of tenants and the contract duration in the three 
selected villages 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification 
Age (years old) Statistics 
-40 41-50 51-60 61- total mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(years) (years) (years) (years) 
FAZLE ABAD 3 1 3 3 10 52.6 12.7 70 32 
KADAME 7 2 2 2 13 43.7 13.9 70 24 
KALU DHER 1 2 0 4 7 55.3 12.7 70 36 
Duration 0-5 3 3 1 2 9 45.6 13.6 65 24 
Duration 6-10 6 2 2 1 11 43.8 11.5 64 33 
Duration 11-15 0 0 2 3 5 64.0 5.8 70 55 
Duration 16- 2 0 0 3 5 53.8 15.0 70 32 
total 11 5 5 9 30 49.4 14.2 70 24 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.5 the feature of the education in years and the contract duration in the 
three selected villages 
 
classification 
Education (years)     Statistics 
0 5 8 10 total     mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH)     (years) (years) (years) (years) 
FAZLE ABAD 6 2 1 1   10     2.8   3.7 10 0 
KADAME 6 2 1 4   13     4.5   4.4 10 0 
KALU DHER 4 1 1 1   7     3.3   4.0 10 0 
Duration 0-5 5 1 2 1   9     3.4   4.0 10 0 
Duration 6-10 2 3 1 5   11     6.6   3.7 10 0 
Duration 11-15 5 0 0 0   5     0.0   0.0 0 0 
Duration 16- 4 1 0 0   5     1.0   2.0 5 0 
total 16 5 3 6   30     3.6   4.2 10 0 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.6 the feature of the male family labor and the contract duration in the 
three selected villages 
 
Classification 
Num of Family labors (Male, over 15 years old)     Statistics 
1 2-4 5-7 8- total     mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH)     (years) (years) (years) (years) 
FAZLE ABAD 1 7 2 0   10     3.2   1.7 7 1 
KADAME 1 8 3 1   13     3.9   1.9 8 1 
KALU DHER 0 5 0 2   7     5.6   4.6 15 2 
Duration 0-5 1 6 1 1   9     4.3   3.9 15 1 
Duration 6-10 1 8 2 0   11     3.3   1.2 5 1 
Duration 11-15 0 2 1 2   5     6.0   3.0 10 2 
Duration 16- 0 4 1 0   5     3.4   1.9 7 2 
total 2 20 5 3   30     4.1   2.9 15 1 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.7 the feature of the land use and the contract duration in the three selected 
villages 
 
Classification 
Land use (cultivated area; acre)     Statistics 
-4 4-8 8-12 12- total     mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH)     (acre) (acre) (acre) (acre) 
FAZLE ABAD 1 7 1 1   10     6.3   2.6 12 2 
KADAME 1 7 3 2   13     7.7   3.9 17 3 
KALU DHER 1 3 1 2   7     9.3   6.6 22 2.5 
Duration 0-5 1 6 1 1   9     7.1   5.5 22 2 
Duration 6-10 2 6 3 0   11     6.3   2.5 10 2.5 
Duration 11-15 0 2 0 3   5     11.4   5.0 17 5 
Duration 16- 0 3 1 1   5     7.7   2.8 12 4 
total 3 17 5 5   30     7.6   4.5 22 2 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.8 the feature of the age of respondents and the types of contract in the 
three selected villages 
Classification 
Age (years old)     Statistics 
-40 41-50 51-60 61- total     mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH)     (years) (years) (years) (years) 
FAZLE ABAD 3 1 3 3   10     52.6   12.7 70 32 
KADAME 7 2 2 2   13     43.7   13.9 70 24 
KALU DHER 1 2 0 4   7     55.3   12.7 70 36 
Fixed contract 0 0 1 0   1     60.0   0.0 60 60 
Share contract 5 3 2 7   17     52.2   13.8 70 32 
Both F and S 5 2 2 1   10     43.4   13.5 70 24 
Owner 
cultivation 1 0 0 1   2     50.0   14.0 64 36 
total 11 5 5 9   30     49.4   14.2 70 24 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.9 the feature of the education in years and the types of contract in the 
three selected villages 
 
Classification 
Education (years)     Statistics 
0 5 8 10 total     mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH)     (years) (years) (years) (years) 
FAZLE ABAD 6 2 1 1   10     2.8   3.7 10 0 
KADAME 6 2 1 4   13     4.5   4.4 10 0 
KALU DHER 4 1 1 1   7     3.3   4.0 10 0 
Fixed contract 1 0 0 0   1     0.0   0.0 0 0 
Share contract 12 2 1 2   17     2.2   3.7 10 0 
Both F and S 3 2 2 3   10     5.6   4.1 10 0 
Owner 
cultivation 0 1 0 1   2     7.5   2.5 10 5 
total 16 5 3 6   30     3.6   4.2 10 0 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.10 the feature of the male family labor and the types of contract in the 
three selected villages 
Classification 
Num of Family labors (Male, over 15 years old)     Statistics 
1 2-4 5-7 8- total     mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH)     (years) (years) (years) (years) 
FAZLE ABAD 1 7 2 0   10     3.2   1.7 7 1 
KADAME 1 8 3 1   13     3.9   1.9 8 1 
KALU DHER 0 5 0 2   7     5.6   4.6 15 2 
Fixed contract 0 1 0 0   1     4.0   0.0 4 4 
Share contract 1 12 3 1   17     3.6   2.1 10 1 
Both F and S 1 5 2 2   10     5.2   3.8 15 1 
Owner 
cultivation 0 2 0 0   2     2.5   0.5 3 2 
total 2 20 5 3   30     4.1   2.9 15 1 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.11 the feature of the current contracts duration and the types of contract in 
the three selected villages 
Classification 
Duration of the current contract (years)     Statistics 
0-5 6-10 
11-
15 16-                        total     mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
                 (N of 
HH)    (years) (years) (years) (years) 
FAZLE ABAD 4 3 0 3   10     10.0   6.0 20 4 
KADAME 2 6 3 2   13     11.0   5.5 21 4 
KALU DHER 3 2 2 0   7     9.0   4.5 15 4 
Fixed contract 0 1 0 0   1     7.0   0.0 7 7 
Share contract 7 3 2 5   17     10.8   6.5 21 4 
Both F and S 2 5 3 0   10     9.6   4.1 15 4 
Owner 
cultivation 0 2 0 0   2     10.0   0.0 10 10 
total 9 11 5 5   30     10.2   5.5 21 4 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.12 the feature of the land use and the types of contract in the three selected 
villages 
Classification 
Land use (cultivated area; acre)     Statistics 
-4 4-8 8-12 12- total     mean std max min 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH) 
(N of 
HH)     (acre) (acre) (acre) (acre) 
FAZLE ABAD 1 7 1 1   10     6.3   2.6 12 2 
KADAME 1 7 3 2   13     7.7   3.9 17 3 
KALU DHER 1 3 1 2   7     9.3   6.6 22 2.5 
Fixed contract 0 1 0 0   1     6.5   0.0 6.5 6.5 
Share contract 1 12 2 2   17     6.7   3.2 16 2 
Both F and S 1 3 3 3   10     10.0   5.7 22 3 
Owner 
cultivation 1 1 0 0   2     4.3   1.8 6 2.5 
Total 3 17 5 5   30     7.6   4.5 22 2 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Table 2.13 the feature of the land use and the dominant type of contract in the 
three selected villages 
Classification 
Land use (cultivated area; both F & S; acre)     Statistics 
-1        1-2       2-3       3- total     mean std max min 
   (N of 
HH) 
  (N of 
HH) 
 (N of 
HH) 
   (N of 
HH) 
     (N 
of HH)     (acre) (acre) (acre) (acre) 
F = S 0 0 1 1   2     2.8   0.3 3 2.5 
F > S 0 0 0 0   0     0.0   0.0 0 0 
F < S 0 2 2 4   8     2.6   1.0 4 1 
total 0 2 3 5   10     2.6   0.9 4 1 
Source: Base line survey 2014 
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Chapter 3 the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
 
3.1 Background 
 
           The land tenancy arrangements have received considerable attention in the 
literature over the last several decades. However, there is literally a huge amount of 
famous researches published works on land tenancy contracts, specifically in Asia. 
The most leading theme in these writing is a land and labor contracts in agrarian 
economies (“Theories and Facts” Otsuka et al. 1992), and (“A Theory of Contractual 
Structure in Agriculture”, Eswaran et al, 1985). Also, Herring J. (1983) Land to the 
tiller; the political economy of agrarian reforms in South Asia.  
          Most of these studies are discussed, the landlords-tenant’s relationship and their 
contractual parameters but the common conclusion were discussing in short term land 
tenancy contracts. In our research work in the study area, we discussed the long-term 
land tenancy and their multiple contracts in the landlord-tenant relationship from the 
base line survey (2014). The utilization of land natural resources in Pakistan as a whole, 
and particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, getting higher attention due to the recently 
technological changes in agriculture production. The dominant contractual form can 
vary with the crop, the prevailing technology, and the extent of market development 
and other characteristics of the economic and social environment (Eswaran et al. 1985). 
           Thus in the selected research area, land resources are utilized by traditional 
ways of contracts in the landlord-tenant relationship, which were (share, fixed and 
owner). However, the land tenancy contract and a labor employment contract are 
alternative ways of resource endowments in an agrarian economy (Otsuka et al. 1992). 
The important assumption of this research work, to evaluate a hypothetical situation 
of each decision maker (landlord and tenant) in these tenancy contracts by applying a 
multi criteria decision making (MCDM) tool, the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
           However, the evaluation of (AHP) as an instrument or tool applied in property 
sectors from local and global context (Ezwan, M S, 2011, Srinivasan. 1994, Bender et al. 
1997, 2000, Chan, 2002). For the initial agreement between the landlord and tenant, 
there were essential factors (Criteria) which has great impact on these land tenancy 
contract (Alternative) towards the signing process. Thus, (AHP) serves the purpose of 
comparison and finds the important impacting factors of different farming practices 
(Gopal D. B, 2010). However, the selection of a good landlord for a tenant and a reliable 
tenant for a landlord play key role in these contracts for successful land management. 
(ONI, 2010) pointed out in the role of estate surveyors, that a prospective tenant must 
possess; physical appearance, social status, income, while in some cases such 
attributes are imposed by the owner.  
          The implications of theoretical models which are reliable with several stylized 
facts about land tenancy in developing countries agriculture and landlord-tenant 
preferences for these contract choices. However, the tenancy contracts tend to be 
rationed according to the initial endowments of wealth among prospective tenants 
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(Shetty, 1988), thus most empirical research works discussed the important factors for 
non-marketed inputs tenant’s superior endowments such as, managerial ability, credit, 
family labor and bullocks or production technology (Reid, 1976, Zusman, 1979, Bliss 
et al. 1982 and Pant, 1983) for which markets are highly imperfect. On the other hand, 
the ignorance on the part of landlords about tenant’s abilities and assets is quite 
inappropriate for most rural communities because there is little mobility and 
information about it is easily available (Eswaran et al. 1985). 
           Moreover, in the landlord-tenant relationship the personal character of both 
parties were play effective role in the contracts choice in general and specifically in 
our study area, so from the landlord side, to helps his tenant in (bad production years) 
by reducing rent (fixed) and timely division of output in share contract, also solved 
his family and political issues. However, in response the tenant pays loyal services for 
his and his family in farm production as well as in political and social activities. 
According to Otsuka et al (1992), the small community in agrarian economies, social 
interactions among people are intense, therefore both parties may be discouraged 
from behaving opportunistically giving the high expected cost of losing reputation by 
discovery of dishonest behavior. 
           Also the enduring contractual relationship between the landlord and tenant in 
a relative closed village society, there are circumstances in which reputation has a 
significant effect in enforcing the terms of the contract.  
          However, Bell et al. (1989), pointed out, empirical research, which attempts to 
identify the factors of contract choice with due consideration of household 
characteristics is still lacking. In the literature researchers argue, in order for the 
contract to be perfectly enforceable, its term and conditions must be verifiable not only 
to the contracting parties but also to a third party (Holmstrom 1983 and Clive Bull, 
1987). 
          Moreover, in the one period contract, the tenant will maximize his utility 
without regard to the depletion of soil fertility and other damage to the land which 
will adversely affect its future productivity, thus the tendency is like to be stronger 
under the fixed-rent contract than the share and fixed wage contracts because the 
former implies greater returns from the neglect of the land (Otsuka at el. 1992). 
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3.2 Theoretical Explanation of Landlord Factors in AHP with Transaction cost 
Phenomena 
 
          The table represent the decided factors definition from the view point of 
landlords during the face to face interview by conducting the AHP survey in the study 
area. 
 
No.  Factors Definition 
1 Character  The tenant is honest, Hardworking (pay proper and due 
attention towards Agriculture production), Socially 
acceptable in a close village Society and utilize his inner 
potentiality in a sound miner to develop a long-term tenancy 
and personal relationship with landlord and his family. Such 
attitudes of tenants in the land tenancy contracts reduces the 
“monitoring and bargaining cost”.  
2 Financial 
Position 
  
Wealth of the tenant such as pay rent in time (fixed). 
Expenditure on production and their own bullocks or tractor 
in (50:50) share contract.  
3 Men Power Adult labor male (2-3) of tenant family are more concern for 
a landlord because most of the farm work is still done by 
human labor like (plantation, fertilization, spraying, 
especially in (50:50) share tenancy.  
4 Experience The tenant working experience in field of agriculture (5-10 
years), aware from latest technology changes. Such as 
experience tenants are certain much preference in 
operational decision, efficient used of land in (share) and 
taking care of the land quality in (fixed). The phenomena of 
“transaction monitoring cost”.   
5 
  
  
  
  
 
                                                   
Reference  
  
  
  
  
 
A person in the same village will play the role of middle-man 
(facilitator) in the initial signing process in these informal 
tenancy contracts. The most acceptable person for landlord. 
Such as to know the landlord and tenant families very well. 
Such facilitator provides structure to the tenancy contracts, 
also resolve the initial disputes among the contract parties 
and help out in all types of present “transaction cost”. 
6                                                    Distance 
     
The landlords cultivated area close to his home, distance 
away or very far. Incase very far, in such circumstances they 
prefer to make fixed rent contract. Which is also the 
“phenomena of transaction cost” 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
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          However, figure 3.1 showed the selected factors comparison in two steps, first 
the comparison of factors with each other and their comparison with alternatives. Also 
show AHP structure of the landlord respondent. 
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Figure 3.1: A hierarchical representation of the landlord in the land tenancy 
contract. 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
 
  
Distance
Land 
tenancy
contracts
Men 
power
Financial 
position
Experience
Character
Share
Contract. Fixed
Contract.
Owner-
cultivation
.
Reference
  57 
 
3.3 Theoretical Explanation of important factors of tenants in AHP with Transaction 
cost Phenomena 
          The table represent the decided factors definition from the view point of 
tenants during the face to face interview by conducting the AHP survey in the study 
area. 
No.  Factors Definition 
1 Character  The landlord which has a kind behavior, respect the 
tenant and his family such as not only support the 
tenant in farm production but also socially and 
morally. Equally and timely distribute the crop yield 
in share tenancy (50:50). Giving such feeling to 
tenants in land tenure will improve contracts 
efficiency and reduction in “monitoring and 
bargaining cost”.   
  
2 Financial Position The landlord to helps his tenant in the marketed 
inputs such as (fertilizer, hybrid seeds, etc) specially 
in the peak of crop season (growing or harvesting) in 
(share) and treat the tenant in a good way in bad 
agriculture production year in (fixed). 
  
3 Land Condition Before making the contract, the tenant wants to 
know the quality of land, either land is irrigated such 
as (canal or tube-well) irrigation and the fertility of 
the soil as well in both contracts. Especially in fixed 
contract the rent per acre depends upon on the 
quality of landlord available land.  
  
4 House Availability The tenant preferences the availability of house in 
the landlord farm specially in share contract, if not 
available he demands for house before signing the 
contract. In case of fixed contract, the opportunity is 
not available for tenant or pay the rent for it. 
5 Reference Actually the condition from a landlord side for his 
new tenant such as a tenant recently came to the 
study area. 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
          However, figure 3.1 showed the selected factors comparison in two steps, first 
the comparison of factors with each other and their comparison with alternatives. Also 
show AHP structure of the tenant respondent.  
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Figure 3.2: A hierarchical representation of the tenant in the land tenancy contract. 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
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3.4 Objectives of this Study 
 
3.4.1 Objectives 
          To find out the importance of each type of contract in the landlord-tenant 
relationship in the study area. Also to check out the important factor, from landlord 
and tenant point of view in these land tenancy contracts by using AHP. 
 
3.4.2 Hypothetical structure of the study: 
          A hypothetical situation will be created for the selected respondents (Landlords 
and Tenants) because they were actually involved in different types of land tenancy 
contracts. Therefore, the AHP methodology will be adopted to know about the 
important of each attributes with in the alternative. Then each theoretical judgment of 
each decision maker will be weight through Tones methods in AHP. 
 
3.4.3 Input matrix structure of the study: 
          The marked judgments of the decision maker during the survey will be enclosed. 
Then all data will be put in matrix set for further calculations. This procedure will be 
adopted for each individual respondent in the selected study area. 
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Table 3.1 shows factors comparison judgments input matrix of the respondents 
[ ]
1
3
1 1 1 1
5 5 5 2
1
3
Character Men power Experience Financial position Reference
Character 1 1 3 1
Men power 1 1 5 1 3
Experience 1
Financial position 3 1 5 1 1
Reference 1 2 1 1
   
   
   
   =
   
   
      
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
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3.5 Review about AHP 
 
          Alexander (2012), AHP was developed to optimize decision making when one is 
faced with a mix of qualitative, quantitative and sometimes conflicting factors that are 
taken into consideration. Thomas L. Saaty (2008), pointed out, the AHP is a theory of 
measurement through pairwise comparisons and relies on the judgements of experts 
to derive priority scale.  
          Bayazit (2005), the approach of the AHP involves the structuring of any complex 
problem into different hierarchy levels with a view to accomplishing the stated 
objective of a problem. Chauhan et al (2008), described, the AHP allows better, easier 
and more efficient identification of selecting criteria, their weighting and analysis. 
Weinberg (1999), the method permits comparison of alternatives with respect to 
multiple attributes, particularly useful for complex problems. Sato (2005), pointed out, 
the AHP has the subjective judgment of each decision-maker as input and the weight 
of each alternative as output.  
          Thomas L. Saaty (1990), explained, perhaps the most creative task in making a 
decision is to choose the factors that are important for that decision. 
          Table 3.2, from the literature was adopted, which shows the Saaty scale of pair-
wise comparison and intensity of importance for each number. These numbers was 
utilized during the face to face interview of landlords and tenants to weight their 
decision for each factor. 
           Johnson (1980), said that (AHP) in solving problem involves four steps. Step 1. 
Setting up the decision hierarchy by breaking down the decision problem into a 
hierarchy of interrelated decision elements. Step 2. Collecting input data by pairwise 
comparisons of decision elements. Step 3. Using the “eigenvalue” method to estimate 
the relative weights of decision elements, Step 4. Aggregating the relative weights of 
decision elements to arrive at a set of ratings for the decision alternatives. 
          Figure 3.3, was implied, which show all the steps involved in AHP methodology 
and provide information about how to structure the problem. 
Source: Zahedi (1986). 
 
  
  62 
 
 
Figure 3.3 the standard form of decision schema in AHP 
Source: Zahedi (1986). 
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 Table 3.2 Shows Saaty’s scale of pair-wise comparisons 
Intensity of 
importance  
  Definition  Explanation 
1 Equal importance                 Two factors contribute equally to the objective 
2 Weak or slight   
3 Moderate 
importance            
Experience and judgement slightly favor 
4 Moderate plus   
5 Strong importance                 Experience and judgement strongly favor 
6 Strong plus   
7 Demonstrated 
importance      
 
Activity is favored very strong over another 
8 Very, very strong   
9 Extreme Importance 
 
The evidence favoring one activity over another                                                                    
is of the highest possible order of affirmation  
 
2,4,6,8   Intermediate values when compromise is 
needed 
Reciprocals of 
above nonzero       
If factor i has one of the above non-zero number assigned to it when 
compared with factor j, then j has the reciprocal value when compared 
with i                                                       
Source: Thomas L. Saaty, 2008. 
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3.6 Methods for AHP 
 
3.6.1 Study area 
         The study area was Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan, which was selected during 
the baseline survey in year 2014. 
 
3.6.2 Sampling 
          In the first step we selected 10 respondents from the base line survey, conducted 
in (2014), second we were select 6 landlords and 4 tenants meaningfully and not 
randomly on the bases of their deep local knowledge, educational and farming skills 
from the different district and villages in the research area. So in the third step we 
finalized the factors which were important for signing the initial land tenancy 
contracts process in the study area, from the view point of landlord and tenant. In the 
final step we made pairwise comparison of all the important factors and then made its 
comparison with in each alternative by constructing (AHP) model, which was 
developed by (Saaty, 1980). 
          Table 3.3, was developed based on the selected respondents to show their 
selection for AHP survey from each village. Also explain their demographics and 
actual contract type. 
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Table 3.3 Sample selection and demographics with basic statistics 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
 
  
Age Education Farm size Age Education Farm size
(years) (years) (Acre) Share Fixed (years) (years) (Acre) Share Fixed
2 _ 2 48.5 14 17.5 S _ _ _ _ _ _
1 2 3 55 16 3 S _ 51.5 7.5 6 S _
_ 1 1 _ _ _ _ _ 47 0 5 S _
_ 1 1 _ _ _ _ _ 49 10 7 S F
1 _ 1 50 12 35 S F _ _ _ _ _
2 _ 2 50 12 35 S F _ _ _ _ _
6 4 10 50.88 13.5 22.63 S F 49.17 5.83 6 S F
Asfandari
Kaludair
Total
Karnal Sher Killi
Actual contractActual contract
Fazle abad
kadame
Shewa Killi
Classification
Villages
N of HHS
(N of LHH) N of THH Total
Sample selection, Demographics with basic statistics
N of LandLord HH (Mean) N of Tenant HH (Mean)
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3.6.3 Questionnaire  
          A comprehensive excel sheet questionnaire was developed to collect the data 
and information related to the important factors which greatly affect the initial 
contract process in land tenancy contracts and for making a set of pair-wise 
comparison in (AHP). Also, a (Saaty), pair-wise comparison scale from 1-9 in (AHP) 
is applied, to get the data for input matrix and checking out the priority decision 
weights of landlord and tenant towards each selected factor with in each alternative 
(Fixed, Share and Owner). Therefore, each (respondent) is interviewed personally at 
his home/or/field during the field visits to the study area in (2015).  
 
3.6.4 Implementation 
          The interview schedule was pre-tested in the field accordingly from 13
th
of 
August 2015 which was finished in 11
th
 of September 2015. From which we collected 
information about different factors which were important from both sides. Then 
analyzed all the decision using Tone’s Method in AHP. 
 
3.7 The aggregated formula matrix results discussion of landlords in AHP. 
 
          The resulting matrix 3.4 indicates the landlord’s pairwise comparisons judgment 
for each of the alternatives with respect to each criterion. However, we easily capture 
their demand for nonmarket contractual parameter, when they were making a 
contract with landless labors in a competitive labor market to utilize their land 
endowment in study area. Therefore, the weights of the alternative in the resulting set 
clarify the landlord’s judgment preferences for each factors. For example, in case of 
share contract, the dominant factors weights were character 58.2%, men power 51.6% 
and experience 48.9% respectively.  
          However, we observed during the field visits to the research area that the 
landlords have the full bargaining power in the informal land tenancy contract 
arrangements to impose clearly contract demands on their counterparts. Therefore, 
the character of the tenants was more concern in the share contract, especially in 
(50:50) output ratio, the importance of human labor force was still the main source of 
agriculture production in the region as whole and particularly in the research province 
due to the unavailability of latest agriculture technological tools. In the share contract, 
the landlords were demanding for male labor force of the tenant’s family, depends on 
their cultivated area to perform timely farm related task such as (plantation, irrigation 
and spraying etc.) for crop production, when they were signing the contract. 
           However, we observed that the demand for experience and skillful tenants were 
increase due to the recently development in the hybrid varieties of seeds, 
intercropping and change in the agriculture market for the high quality products, such 
as different (vegetable and cash crops). Therefore, the landlords were want to achieve 
the first best efficiency from their share partner in share contract. On the other hand, 
the observed weights of financial position, reference and distance was 31.06%, 45% 
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and 17.82% as reported in the share contract. However, in fixed contracts, the 
responding resulting weights were in contrast of share contract in the study villages. 
The reported important weights of criterion were distance 75.1%, financial position 
54.08% and reference 49.3% respectively. 
           In general, we observed from the behavior of the landlords in these study 
villages that they were mostly concerned with timely payment issues of the tenants 
and the cultivated area which were far from their home town or absentee landlords 
they prefer to make a fixed rent contract. Therefore, from the observed weights it’s 
clear that they were not much concern with the other characteristics of the tenant’s 
households. In both contracts the matrix set indicates that reference such as (a third 
party) play comparatively equal role because without knowing the tenants 
background the landlords were not making the contracts with them and if any conflict 
raised in the beginning he was play the role as a facilitator. The other reported weights 
were character 36.6%, 7.75% men power and experience 9.48% as reported from these 
villages in case of fixed contract. 
           In case of owner cultivation, the landlords were managing all the farm task by 
himself with the help of their own family labor and were hiring the tenants as a causal 
labor on fixed wage. The data set important weights for owner cultivation of the 
landlord’s judgments were experience 41.3%, men power 40.3% and 11.5% financial 
position as reported. 
          Finally, the portions of the landlord’s judgments to be allocated to each land 
tenancy contract are found by determining the product of the factors priorities and the 
alternative weights as shown below. In the pairwise comparison judgments of the 
landlords with in the attributes, the important weights were men power 24.8%, 
reference 24.22%, experience 17.9% and financial position 17.6% respectively. The 
composite score indicates the final judgments of the landlords for their natural 
resource utilization through land tenancy contracts. Therefore, 47.8% they were 
willing to make share contract, 31.6% to made fixed contract and 20.6% to work as 
owner cultivator. 
          However, in general in the studies villages, most of the landlords were working 
in long term informal land tenancy contracts and their dominant contract was share, 
followed by fixed contract and some were owner cultivator (base line survey 2014). So 
the AHP results in hypothetical situation proved the landlord’s preferences for each 
criterion with in the alternative for their new tenants before signing the contracts with 
them and showed their importance weights for each decision in the pairwise 
comparison.  
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3.8 The factors comparison results of landlords in AHP with critical indices. 
 
          Table 3.5 show the factors comparison input matrices, priority weights, principle 
Eigen value and consistence indices of the 6 landlords household judgments. In case 
of L1 in the factor comparison the dominant priority weights was 30.2% financial-
position, 29.8% men-power, followed by character 17.5%, reference 16.4% and less 
important is experience 6.1% as reported from the study villages. On the other hand, 
the leading priority weights for L2 was experience 25.3%. The equally important 
decision weights were factor character and reference 22.9%, other weights are 20.4% 
men-power, 8.5% financial-position respectively. In case of L4, the dominants factors 
judgments were experience 30.1%, men-power 26%and reference 24.9%. The least 
weights was 8% financial-position and 11% character as reported. For L3, the heavy 
weights was men-power 50.5% and financial-position 28.8%. However, in case of L5 
the dominant priority weights were reference 43.3%, men-power 23.8, followed by 
experience 16.9% and character 16.1% respectively reported from the study District. 
For L6, the priority weights of selected factors were, reference 35%, financial-position 
29.2 and experience 23.5% respectively.  
          In the overall factors comparison of the landlords respondents it was found, that 
the factors men-power and reference is the most dominant priority weights. The table 
also showed the consistency ratio of the landlord’s decision in the criterion 
comparison through which their decision were consistent on different level, 2.3%, 6%, 
7.1%, 7.3%, 7.7% and 9.8% as reported from the study villages. 
 
3.9 The individual landlord factors evaluation within land tenancy contracts. 
 
          In this section of the results and discussion we were represents the 6 landlords 
decision making behavior for the each selected criterion comparison with in the land 
tenancy contracts (share, fixed, owner cultivation). Also showed their input matrices 
with priority weights and consistency of the judgments. 
 
          Landlord 1: Table 3.6 showed evaluation for his selected factors within the 
alternative. In case of share contract the dominant priority criterions were character 
58.2%, experience 51.5% and men-power 48.7%, in addition the factor financial-
position 48.1%, 36.7% character were leading in fixed-rent contract. However the 
factor reference 47.4% was equally important in both cases for making the new 
contract with tenant. In case of owner-cultivation the dominant weight factors were 
men-power 43.5% and 38.8% experience to utilize his land endowment. The 
consistency ratio for each criterions within the alternative were 4.6%, 1.1%, 6.9%, 2.5% 
and 0% as reported from the L1 decisions in AHP. 
 
          Landlord 2: The resulting table 3.7 presented assessment in selected criterions 
within the land tenancy arrangement for his land resources. In case of share contract 
the dominant priority factors weight were character 58.2%, men-power 48.7% and 
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experience 45.2% respectively. For fixed contract the factors financial-position 48.7%, 
36.7% character were dominant priorities. In addition, the factor reference 47.4% was 
equally important in both contracts for making the new contract with tenant. In case 
of owner-cultivation the dominant weight factors were 47.6% experience and men-
power 43.5% respectively. The decision consistency ratio of L2 in AHP analysis for 
each criterions within alternative were 4.6%, 1.1%, 1.1%, 0.2% and 0% as reported. 
 
          Landlord 3: The table 3.8 indicated results of important factors within the 
alternative. In case of fixed contract the dominant priority factors weight were 
distance 75.1%, financial-position 73.1% and reference 58.2%. For share contract the 
factors men-power 48.7%, 36.7% reference were dominant priorities. However, the 
factor men-power 43.5% was the only important priority in case of owner-cultivation. 
The decision consistency ratio of L3 in AHP analysis for each criterions within 
alternative were 1.1%, 4.6%, 5.6% and 2.5% as reported. 
 
          Landlord 4: Table 3.9 showed evaluation for his selected factors within the 
alternative. In case of share and fixed-rent contract the criterion character and 
reference 47.4% were equally important in the comparison. In case of self-cultivation 
the dominant priority factors weight were men-power 43.5% and 43.5% experience 
respectively. For share contract the important weights were men-power 48.7%, 
Experience 48.7% and financial-position 38.7% when making the initial contract with 
new tenant. In case of fixed financial-position 44.3% was the dominant weight. The 
consistency ratio for each criterions within the alternative were 0.0%, 1.6%, 1.1%, 1.1% 
and 0% as reported from the L4 decisions in the comparison in AHP. 
 
          Landlord 5: The table 3.10 indicated results of important factors within the land 
tenancy contracts. In case of share contract the dominant priority factors weight were 
character 58.2%, men-power 57.4% and experience 48.7%. For fixed contract the factors 
reference 47.4%, 36.7% character were dominant priorities. However, the factors 
experience 43.5% and men-power 36.1% were the important priority in case of owner-
cultivation. The decision consistency ratio of L5 in AHP analysis for each criterions 
within alternative were 4.6%, 4.6%, 0% and 1.1% as reported. 
 
          Landlord 6: The table 3.11 indicated results of important factors within the land 
tenancy contracts. In case of share contract the dominant priority factors weight were 
men-power 64.9% and experience 48.1%. For fixed contract the factors financial-
position 61%. The factor reference 47.4% was equally important in both cases. 36.7% 
character were dominant priorities. However, the factors experience 40.5% and men-
power 27.9% were the leading priority in case of owner-cultivation. The decision 
consistency ratio of L6 in AHP analysis for each criterions within alternative were 5.6%, 
8.1%, 0% and 2.5% as reported. 
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4.10 The aggregated matrix formula results discussion of tenants in AHP.  
 
          The resulting matrix 3.12 of the tenant’s respondents showed the importance 
weights with in the alternative. Therefore, in case of share contract the dominant 
criterion weights were, house availability 68.8%, financial position 67.3% and 
character 64.2% reported from the study villages, when tenants were entering to the 
share tenancy arrangements with landlords. However, from the discussion of long 
term tenancy contract duration (author 2014), we saw that most of sharecroppers lived 
in the country as whole and specifically in the research area, houses developed by 
their landlords. 
        Actually one of the priority demand of the tenants during the initial contract 
signing process, when they were entering in share tenancy relationship such as (50:50) 
ratio, with their landlords, because, their economical position was not very strong, 
compared with those tenants which were working in fixed rent tenancy. In case of 
financial position of the landlords for the tenants in share contract in the research area 
were important in many ways, like some time a sharecropper need advanced money 
for their family oriented issues such as (death, Marriages etc) circumstances, so first 
they want to borrowed money from their own landlords and some time they need 
credit for Agriculture marketed inputs, such as (fertilizer, weedicide and pesticide) to 
purchase.  
          On the other hand, the less important factors judgments weights in share 
contract were, 47.3% reference and 36.6% land condition as reported. In case of fixed 
contract in the resulting set for the tenants when they were making the initial contract 
settlement with their landlords, the important priority weights were, land condition 
58.2% and reference 47.37% respectively. 
           However, due to the contract norms and condition in the study area, the 
landlords were not bounded to provide any assistance to his lease and the tenants 
were only thinking about the landlords cultivated land condition such as (soil fertility, 
irrigated or unirrigated etc) collect all this information before signing the contract and 
pay rents in accordance such as (advance or after the harvest of cash crop). The 
reference role was more important in both cases, actually a condition from the 
landlord’s side in general in the study villages, also we heard during the field visits 
that was not the tenant’s preferences in the initial land tenancy arrangements but the 
demand of their opponents.  
          Therefore, the other priority weights in fixed contract were, 28.4% character, 
23.6% financial position of the landlords and house availability 22.9% as reported from 
the studies villages. We were neglecting the discussion related to owner cultivation 
because the tenants were no concern with the landlords but if tenants want, they only 
work with a landlord as casual labor or permanent labor.  
          However, the AHP resulting matrix set identified judgments weights of each 
criterion with in each alternative of the tenant’s respondents, the weights showed their 
choices for each tenancy contracts before starting the contracts with their landlords. 
Finally, the proportions of the tenant’s decisions to be apportioned to each land 
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tenancy contract are instituted by determining the product of the attributes and the 
alternative weights as shown below.   
          In the pairwise comparison decisions of the tenants with in the factors, the 
important weights were land condition 39.6%, reference 11.1%, house availability 
22.2% and character 11.8% respectively. However, the combined score indicates the 
final judgments of the tenants for their human resource deployment through land 
tenancy contracts. However, 51.7% they were preferring to make share contract, 41.7% 
to made fixed contract and 6.2% to work as causal labor in the selected studies villages. 
 
3.11 The individual matrix formula results of tenants in AHP.  
 
          In this section of the results and discussion we were represents the 4 tenant’s 
decision making behavior for the each selected criterion comparison with in the land 
tenancy contracts (share, fixed, owner cultivation) through matrix formulation. 
 
          Tenant 1: the resulting matrix 3.13 showed the importance weights with in the 
alternative. Therefore, in case of share contract the dominant criterion weights were, 
character 67.1%, house-availability 64.9% and financial-position 57.3%, when he 
entering to the share tenancy arrangement with landlord. In case of fixed contract, the 
important priority weights was land condition 58.2%. The factor reference 47.37% was 
equally important in both contracts. In case of owner-cultivation he work as labor. In 
the pairwise comparison decisions, the dominant weights were land condition 36.4%, 
house availability 30.1% and financial-position 21.5% respectively. However, the 
combined score indicates the final judgments of T1 human resource deployment 
through land tenancy contracts. Though, 52.27% T1 preferring to make share contract, 
41.6% to made fixed contract and 6.1% to work as causal labor in the selected studies 
area. 
 
          Tenant 2: the resulting matrix set 3.14 indicate the importance weights with in 
the land tenancy. However, in case of share contract the dominant criterion weights 
were, character 66.9%, house-availability 73.06% and financial-position 73.06%. In case 
of fixed contract, the important priority weights was land condition 58.2%. The factor 
reference 47.37% was equally important in both contracts. In case of owner-cultivation 
nothing important. In the pairwise comparison decisions, the dominant weights were 
character 31.1%, land condition 24%, house availability 18.4% and reference 22.4% as 
reported. However, the combined score indicates the final judgments of T2 human 
resource arrangement through land tenancy contracts. Therefore, 56.6% T2 desiring to 
make share contract, 36.39% fixed contract and 6.9% to work as causal labor. 
 
          Tenant 3: the resulting matrix set 3.15 indicate the importance weights with in 
the land tenancy. However, in case of share contract the dominant criterion weights 
were, character 64.9%, house-availability 64.9% and financial-position 66.9%. In case 
of fixed contract, the priority weights were land condition 58.2%, house-availability 
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and character 27.9% equally important. In case of owner-cultivation nothing 
important. In the pairwise comparison, the dominant weights were land condition 
52.1% and house-availability 34.3% respectively. However, the combined score 
indicates the final judgments of T3 human resource deployment through land tenancy 
contracts. Therefore, 50.3% T3 wishing to make share contract, 43.4% fixed contract 
and 6.2% to work as causal labor. 
 
Tenant 4: the resulting matrix 3.16 showed the importance weights with in the 
alternative. Therefore, in case of share contract the dominant criterion weights were, 
character 58.2%, house-availability 73.06% and financial-position 73.06%, when he 
entering to the share tenancy arrangement with landlord. In case of fixed contract, the 
important priority weights was land condition 58.2% and character 36.6%. The factor 
reference 47.37% was equally important in both contracts. In case of owner-cultivation 
he work as labor. In the pairwise comparison decisions, the dominant weights were 
land condition 54%, house availability 12.9% and character 13.5% respectively. 
However, the combined score indicates the final judgments of T4 human resource 
deployment through land tenancy contracts. Therefore, 48.2% T4 preferring to make 
share contract, 45.9% to made fixed contract and 5.5% to work as causal labor in the 
selected studies area. 
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Table 3.4 the AHP aggregated result of Landlords 
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Source: Author Survey August 2015 
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Table 3.5 represents the AHP input matrixes, Priority weights, Principle Eigen 
values, Consistency index, Random index and Consistency ratio of the landlords 
 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
 
  
Criteria C M E F R Priority Lamdamax C.I. R.I. C.R.
Character 1.000 1.000 3.000 0.333 1.000 0.175 5.268 0.067 1.120 0.060
Men-power 1.000 1.000 5.000 1.000 3.000 0.298
Experience 0.333 0.200 1.000 0.200 0.500 0.061
Financial. P 3.000 1.000 5.000 1.000 1.000 0.302
Reference 1.000 0.333 2.000 1.000 1.000 0.164
Sum 6.333 3.533 16.000 3.533 6.500
Criteria C M F E R Priority Lamdamax C.I. R.I. C.R.
Character 1.000 1.000 3.000 1.000 1.000 0.229 5.102 0.026 1.120 0.023
Men-power 1.000 1.000 3.000 0.500 1.000 0.204
Financial. P 0.333 0.333 1.000 0.500 0.333 0.085
Experience 1.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.000 0.253
Reference 1.000 1.000 3.000 1.000 1.000 0.229
Sum 4.333 5.333 12.000 4.000 4.333
Criteria C F M E R Priority Lamdamax C.I. R.I. C.R.
Character 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.200 1.000 0.110 5.317 0.079 1.120 0.071
Financial. P 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.333 0.200 0.080
Men-power 3.000 3.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.260
Experience 5.000 3.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.301
Reference 1.000 5.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.249
Sum 11.000 13.000 3.667 3.533 4.200
Criteria M R F D Priority Lamdamax C.I. R.I. C.R.
Men-power 1.000 3.000 3.000 5.000 0.505 4.198 0.066 0.900 0.073
Reference 0.333 1.000 0.333 3.000 0.143
Finance 0.333 3.000 1.000 5.000 0.288
Distance 0.200 0.333 0.200 1.000 0.064
Sum 1.867 7.333 4.533 14.000
Criteria E C M R Priority Lamdamax C.I. R.I. C.R.
Experience 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.169 4.207 0.069 0.900 0.077
Character 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.250 0.161
Men-powr 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.238
Reference 3.000 4.000 1.000 1.000 0.433
Sum 6.000 7.000 4.000 2.583
Criteria M R F D Priority Lamdamax C.I. R.I. C.R.
Men-power 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.200 0.123 4.264 0.088 0.900 0.098
Experience 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.235
Finance 3.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.292
Reference 5.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.350
Sum 10.000 4.000 3.333 3.200
 The 6 Landlord AHP results
Factors preriority weigths and consistency indices of L4
Factors preriority weigths and consistency indices of L5
Factors preriority weigths and consistency indices of L6
Factors preriority weigths and consistency indices of L1
Factors preriority weigths and consistency indices of L2
Factors preriority weigths and consistency indices of L3
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Table 3.6 show each factor evaluation with in alternative for landlord 1 
 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
 
  
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 2.000 9.000 0.582 3.054 0.027 0.580 0.046
Fixed 0.500 1.000 9.000 0.367
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.051
Sum 1.611 3.111 19.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 7.000 1.000 0.487 3.013 0.006 0.580 0.011
Fixed 0.143 1.000 0.200 0.078
Owner 1.000 5.000 1.000 0.435
Sum 2.143 13.000 2.200
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 7.000 1.000 0.515 3.080 0.040 0.580 0.069
Fixed 0.143 1.000 0.333 0.097
Owner 1.000 3.000 1.000 0.388
Sum 2.143 11.000 2.333
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 1.000 3.000 0.405 2.826 0.015 0.580 0.025
Fixed 0.500 1.000 5.000 0.481
Owner 0.333 0.200 1.000 0.114
Sum 1.833 2.200 9.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474 3.000 0.000 0.580 0.000
Fixed 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.053
Sum 2.111 2.111 19.000
lanlord 1
AHP for F1 (character)
AHP for F2 (Men power)
AHP for F3 (Experience)
AHP for F4 (Financial position)
AHP for F5 (Reference)
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Table 3.7 show each factor evaluation with in alternative for landlord 2 
 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
 
  
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 2.000 9.000 0.582 3.054 0.027 0.580 0.046
Fixed 0.500 1.000 9.000 0.367
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.051
Sum 1.611 3.111 19.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 7.000 1.000 0.487 3.013 0.006 0.580 0.011
Fixed 0.143 1.000 0.200 0.078
Owner 1.000 5.000 1.000 0.435
Sum 2.14286 13 2.2
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 1.000 5.000 0.435 3.013 0.006 0.580 0.011
Fixed 1.000 1.000 7.000 0.487
Owner 0.200 0.143 1.000 0.078
Sum 2.200 2.143 13.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 6.000 1.000 0.452 3.003 0.001 0.580 0.002
Fixed 0.167 1.000 0.143 0.072
Owner 1.000 7.000 1.000 0.476
Sum 2.167 14.000 2.143
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474 3.000 0.000 0.580 0.000
Fixed 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.053
Sum 2.111 2.111 19.000
Landlord 2
AHP for F1 (character)
AHP for F4 (Experience)
AHP for F5 (Reference)
AHP for F2 (Men power)
AHP for F3 (Financial position)
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Table 3.8 show each factor evaluation with in alternative for landlord 3 
 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
 
  
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 7.000 1.000 0.487 3.013 0.006 0.580 0.011
Fixed 0.143 1.000 0.200 0.078
Owner 1.000 5.000 1.000 0.435
Sum 2.142857 13 2.2
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 0.500 9.000 0.367 3.054 0.027 0.580 0.046
Fixed 2.000 1.000 9.000 0.582
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.051
Sum 3.111 1.611 19.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 0.200 3.000 0.188 3.065 0.032 0.580 0.056
Fixed 5.000 1.000 7.000 0.731
Owner 0.333 0.143 1.000 0.081
Sum 6.333 1.343 11.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 0.200 3.000 0.178 3.029 0.015 0.580 0.025
Fixed 5.000 1.000 9.000 0.751
Owner 0.333 0.111 1.000 0.070
Sum 6.333 1.311 13.000
AHP for F4 (reference)
Lanlord 3
AHP for F1 (distance)
AHP for F2 (Financial position)
AHP for F3 (Men power)
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Table 3.9 show each factor evaluation with in alternative for landlord 4 
 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
 
  
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474 3.000 0.000 0.580 0.000
Fixed 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.053
Sum 2.111 2.111 19.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 1.000 2.000 0.387 3.018 0.009 0.580 0.016
Fixed 1.000 1.000 3.000 0.443
Owner 0.500 0.333 1.000 0.169
Sum 2.500 2.333 6.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 7.000 1.000 0.487 3.013 0.006 0.580 0.011
Fixed 0.143 1.000 0.200 0.078
Owner 1.000 5.000 1.000 0.435
Sum 2.143 13.000 2.200
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 7.000 1.000 0.487 3.013 0.006 0.580 0.011
Fixed 0.143 1.000 0.200 0.078
Owner 1.000 5.000 1.000 0.435
Sum 2.143 13.000 2.200
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474 3.000 0.000 0.580 0.000
Fixed 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.053
Sum 2.111 2.111 19.000
Landlord 4
AHP for F1 (character)
AHP for F2 (Financial position)
AHP for F3 (Men power)
AHP for F4 (Experience)
AHP for F5 (Reference)
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Table 3.10 show each factor evaluation with in alternative for landlord 5 
 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
 
  
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 7.000 2.000 0.574 3.054 0.027 0.580 0.046
Fixed 0.143 1.000 0.143 0.065
Owner 0.500 7.000 1.000 0.361
Sum 1.643 15.000 3.143
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 2.000 9.000 0.582 3.054 0.027 0.580 0.046
Fixed 0.500 1.000 9.000 0.367
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.051
Sum 1.611 3.111 19.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474 3 0 0.58 0
Fixed 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.053
Sum 2.111 2.111 19.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 7.000 1.000 0.487 3.013 0.006 0.580 0.011
Fixed 0.143 1.000 0.200 0.078
Owner 1.000 5.000 1.000 0.435
Sum 2.143 13.000 2.200
lanlord 5
AHP for F3 (Men power)
AHP for F4 (character)
AHP for F2 (reference)
AHP for F1 (experience)
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Table 3.11 show each factor evaluation with in alternative for landlord 6 
 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
 
  
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 7.000 3.000 0.649 3.065 0.032 0.580 0.056
Fixed 0.143 1.000 0.200 0.072
Owner 0.333 5.000 1.000 0.279
Sum 1.476 13.000 4.200
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 0.500 1.000 0.225 3.094 0.047 0.580 0.081
Fixed 2.000 1.000 5.000 0.610
Owner 1.000 0.200 1.000 0.166
Sum 4.000 1.700 7.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474 3.000 0.000 0.580 0.000
Fixed 1.000 1.000 9.000 0.474
Owner 0.111 0.111 1.000 0.053
Sum 2.111 2.111 19.000
Alternative S. F. O. Priority Lamdamax CI RI CR
Share 1.000 5.000 1.000 0.481 3.029 0.015 0.580 0.025
Fixed 0.200 1.000 0.333 0.114
Owner 1.000 3.000 1.000 0.405
Sum 2.200 9.000 2.333
landlord 6
AHP for F1 (Men power)
AHP for F3 (finance)
AHP for F4 (reference)
AHP for F2 (experience)
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Table 3.12 the AHP aggregated results of Tenants 
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Source: Author Survey August 2015 
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Table 3.13 shows the matrix formula AHP results of tenant 1 
Share contract Fixed contrac
0.6716 0.2654 0.0629
0.3667 0.5820 0.0513
0.6491 0.2790 0.0719
0.5736 0.3614 0.0650
0.4737 0.4737 0.0
Character
Land condition
Houseavailability
Financial position
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Source: Author Survey August 2015 
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Table 3.14 shows the matrix formula AHP results of tenant 2 
Share contract Fixed contrac
0.6694 0.2426 0.0879
0.3667 0.5820 0.0513
0.7306 0.1884 0.0810
0.7306 0.1884 0.0810
0.4737 0.4737 0.0
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Source: Author Survey August 2015 
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Table 3.15 shows the matrix formula AHP results of tenant 3 
Sharecontract Fixed contract Owner cultivation
Character
Land condition
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       = × + × + ×       
              
Financial position
ty
Overall
0.6694 0.5031
0.0676 0.2426 0.4346
0.0879 0. 2
.
06 3
+
   
   × =   
      
 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
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Table 3.16 shows the matrix formula AHP results of tenant 4 
Share contract Fixed contrac
0.5820 0.3667 0.0513
0.3667 0.5820 0.0513
0.7306 0.1884 0.0810
0.7306 0.1884 0.0810
0.4737 0.4737 0.0
Character
Land condition
Houseavailability
Financial position
References 526
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
t Owner cultivation
 
Land condition HouseaCharacter vailabili
0.5820 0.3667 0.7306
0.1354 0.3667 0.5401 0.5820 0.1295 0.1884
0.0513 0.
Share contract
Fixed contrac
0513 0.081
t + ×
Owner cul 0tivation
       
       = × + ×       
              
Financial position R
ty
Overefer allence
0.7306 0.4737 0.4828
0.0740 0.1884 0.1210 0.4737 0.4597
0.0810 0.0526 0 5
.
.057
     
     + × + × =     
          
 
 
Source: Author Survey August 2015 
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Chapter 4 Consultancy Modeling of Linear Programing 
 
4.1 Background 
 
          Being a developing country, the role of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province 
agriculture sector in the socio-economic structure of Pakistan is playing essential role. 
As an agrarian economy majority of the population are still living in the rural areas 
and most of them are involve in the agriculture farm production by producing 
different food and cash crops, like (Wheat, Maize, Tobacco and Sugarcane etc) follow 
a traditional way of cropping pattern. However, the high increase in the population 
from last decades, the demand for utilization of limited land natural resources are 
increasing.  
          Therefore, the efficient increase in farm production is the higher concern, which 
still not exist in the country as whole and particularly in the study area. Due to the 
high availability of human labor force in agriculture market of the study area and 
undeveloped industrial sector, the adaptation of latest agriculture mechanization 
technologies make it difficult to implement for the improvement of farm production 
efficiency. However, the efficiency will be achieved by facilitating each decision maker 
(farmer) through adequate training and proper knowledge about cropping pattern 
and yield production.  
          Irfan Ullah (2015) pointed out, beside the technological improvement, the high 
skill labor is also a major prerequisite for the optimal utilization of the available 
resources. However, for the achievement of crop production efficiency the role of land 
tenure arrangements cannot be ignored in the landlord tenant relationship (Khan et al 
2016). The important assumption of this research work, to develop a farm planning 
model for each decision maker (farmer) by applying linear programming program 
approaches.  
 
4.2 An Overview about Linear Programming 
 
          Linear programming is a mathematical approach connected with the allocation 
of restricted resources. Therefore, the procedure is to optimize the objectives subject 
to the constraint either by maximization or minimization. However, Bender et al 
(1990) explained, that linear programming is a powerful optimization technique for 
modeling complex system. In the agriculture production the objective is to define and 
set up the decision making problem of a farm manager (farmer) as a LP problem in 
the available resources.  
          The management skills of the decision maker, which include qualitative as well 
as quantitative abilities, are the key attributes of the basis for one’s decision and in 
quantitative techniques like LP have become the powerful tools which are often used 
to improve managerial decision making (Harry and Kent 2011). Therefore, the LP 
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model allow the decision maker (farmer) to make optimal use of restricted available 
resources such as (land, family labor, wealth etc.). 
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4.3 The General form of Linear Programming 
 
 
Source: Harry and Kent 2011, “Mathematical programming for Agriculture and 
resource economics”. 
 
4.4 The “XLP” 
 
          To accomplish above objective, we used the tool of “XLP" is a computer program 
running on Excel in Microsoft Windows to compute the optimal solution of a LP. XLP 
can provide an optimal solution for a LP model. It can solve a goal programming (GP) 
model, which can incorporate multiple objectives such as average income and reduced 
working time. It can also solve integer programming (IP) models, which can 
incorporate productive elements counted by discrete units, such as domestic animals, 
green houses, or fixed costs.   
          The LP model is entered on an Excel sheet “tableau” in a particular format, an 
additional XLP menu bar of computational options is added to the Excel menu bar at 
startup. The optimal solution is shown on worksheet as a “computed result”. XLP can 
be downloaded from the following URL: http://39you.net/xlp/. 
 
4.5 The objective of this study 
 
          The objective of this article is to present analysis technique by linear 
programming that can be combined into farm management linear programing model, 
to examine the economic effect of the four major crops grower as well as their 
production and income. Also will be checked out the efficient decision making 
behavior of share and fixed rent contract farmers. 
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Chapter 5 Observation and simulation  
 
5.1 Background 
 
          First the case envisaged by Marshall. According to him, the output sharing 
discourages work efforts, and the resulting suboptimum is widely known as the 
Marshallian inefficiency. There is the  conflict of interest between the contracting 
parties so long as the agents work efforts contributes to increased output and the 
landlords income positively depends on output, because  landlords wants the tenant 
work harder, where work efforts generates disutility to him. Among tenancy contracts, 
share tenancy is more common than fixed rent tenancy in Asia. Because share tenancy 
has risk sharing benefits even though resource allocation under share contract is less 
efficient than under a fixed-rent contract? 
          According to Cheung (1969) if the work efforts of the tenant is directly observed 
and contractually enforceable, then the equivalent results can be obtained by any 
contract. If the contract is enforceable, the resource allocation and the incomes of tiller 
and landlords are equivalent under the fixed-rent, share and fixed-wage contracts in 
equilibrium. This contrasts with the Marshallian argument that the share contract 
yields an under-supply of the tiller efforts per unit of land and a lower income for the 
landlord compared with the fixed-rent contract. Therefore, the choice of a share 
contract involves some sacrifices of work incentives for the sake of risk sharing 
(Stiglitz 1974). Resource allocation is more efficient in owner-cultivation than share 
tenanted land because there is no incentive problem in the contract.  
          However, because of the disincentive effect of output sharing on work effort, 
expected output per unit of land tends to be lower under the share contract than under 
the fixed-rent and owner-cultivation. The equal sharing rule is not optimum for the 
landlords, unless the tenant work effort is also enforceable. Therefore, first-best 
efficiency is not restored by the rule of equal output and input-cost sharing if work 
effort is unenforceable. Source (Otsuka et al 1992). 
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Conclusion 
 
          The conclusion of this study is mainly based on the three discourses in order to 
understand the sustainable relationship between landlords and tenants about 
contractual choices. Therefore, we divided the dissertation into three main parts, 
which are discussed below.  
 
          Research 1: This study was based on the baseline survey which was conducted 
in Feb, 2014 and was checked out the features of land tenancy contracts between the 
landlords and tenants in study area, Swabi in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan. 
Especially the multiple tenancy contract and the long-term duration were much 
surprising in the study area because from the literature most of the empirical studies 
were worked on short-term tenancy contracts, which means one crop season, and 
relationship between single landlord and tenants or labor contracts. In the next step, 
in depth interview to some of the respondents in this study from the study area should 
be made on the basis of long-term duration and types of the contract, and the reasons 
why the landlord and the tenant proceed for the long-term contracts can be clarified. 
And to finalize the model on decision making and estimation based on the crop 
selection with their dynamics in each type of tenancy contracts may be very important 
in the decision support to the tenant when they are facing on the arrangement to 
cultivate and to select the suitable crops. 
 
          Research 2: Most of land tenancy literature discussed the landlord tenant 
relationship and their decision-making behavior in farm production area. This study 
uses AHP to identify the important attributes in land tenancy contracts that the 
landlords and tenants are demanding before signing the contract. The AHP 
application presented, provides informatics results of each relative factors in tenancy 
contracts and clarity of the finding of each respondent judgments in different villages 
of the targeted area. Thus, the dominant factors for landlords that influence the land 
tenancy choices shows that character, men power, experience in share contract and 
distance, financial position of the tenant’s household in fixed contract were most 
influential factors for signing the agreement. On the opposite side the significant 
factors for tenants’ choices in land tenancy shows that house availability, financial 
position, character in share contract and land condition, reference in fixed contract of 
the landlord’s household are main important factors. In addition, all the important 
factors and their weights being found by AHP tool for new contract were ensure a 
secure tenure between the contracting parties. Also, the factor character, reference, 
experience and distance has played key role in the reduction of transaction cost 
phenomena for the contracting parties in the land tenancy contracts in study area. The 
quantification of the impacting factors of the land tenancy contracts is an important 
piece of information that will contribute to the landlord’s tenant’s decision making in 
agriculture production and development in general and particularly in the region.  
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      Research 3: This study has examined and developed the farm planning models for 
share and fixed- rent tenants. Also the land, labor productivity and profitability 
comparison of share and fixed contract tenants were made. First, the models 
suggested and aggregated the labor hour coefficient on the basis of selected crops per 
acre operations. Second, profit coefficients, such as gross revenue and variable cost, 
was totaled in acres on the basis of their contractual parameter. The XLP arrangements 
presented provide of informatics results on the alternative models and shows their 
efficiency through optimal solution. The calculated results of land tenancy contracts, 
namely the comparison of share and fixed-rent farm, were organized. The high 
cultivated optimal acreages of fixed contract model showed that the tenant perform 
all the farm task, such as planting, harvesting, post-harvest and so on,  persistently 
and timely. The results also imply significant profitability of fixed tenant model in the 
land constraint by shadow prices, if one more acre should be added in the contract. 
The results also indicate that payment of rent/ acre to landlord, give them full 
decision-making power, due to which first best resource allocation and high income 
from the contract was achieved. Thus, the fixed-tenant was more profitable because 
by taking all the production risk and his own financial interest.  On the other hand, 
the share tenant optimal results showed that his cultivated crop acreages was low 
because of his inefficient working efforts and contract sharing parameter, means that 
the output share make the tenant work efforts inefficient. In land productivity 
comparison, the fixed-rent farmers were productive in maize and tobacco crops while 
the share formers were productive in sugarcane and wheat crops. In case of labor 
productivity, the fixed-rent farmers were productive in sugarcane, wheat and maize 
crops while the share tenants only labor productive in tobacco crop. However, in total 
land and labor profitability the fixed-rent contract tenants were more profitable than 
share tenants. Therefore, the results imply that share tenants was not perform farm 
tasks persistently, due to which the first best resource allocation and high profit from 
the contract were not realized as compared with the fixed contract. These results are 
true related to the land tenancy literature. (According to the theory of Marshallian 
inefficiency). Therefore, the land tenancy models estimation and comparison of this 
work refer to the farm management and sustainable agriculture development in the 
region that do not yet exit. This study recommends that the agriculture and extension 
services departments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province to apply XLP as a tool in the 
wide range of farm planning decision support system. 
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